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THE ALL EVENTS TESTS IN AN 
ERA OF SELF-REGULATION 
GLENN WALBERG*
ABSTRACT
 Accrual-method taxpayers must use the all events tests to 
account for rights and liabilities under contracts for sales of goods 
and services. These longstanding tests evolved from transactions 
that involved relatively straightforward exchanges of goods or ser-
vices for payments, and the tests currently reflect an expectation 
that a taxpayer will usually make an accrual when a seller’s per-
formance fixes the contracting parties’ respective right to and lia-
bility for payment. Business practices have changed such that many 
sales now occur in relationships where contracting parties assume, 
monitor, and enforce process-related obligations, including adop-
tions of codes of conduct by members of global supply chains. This 
Article explains how these efforts to self-regulate transactions com-
plicate applications of the all events tests because the expectations 
of performance and consequences of noncompliance for credence 
attributes of goods or services have uncertain effects on the “fixed” 
nature of payment obligations. In order to avoid these complica-
tions, the Article proposes that the all events tests should recognize 
an implied requirement of acceptance. Under this proposal, a buyer’s 
acceptance of goods or services, rather than the seller’s performance, 
would establish a fixed payment obligation and respect the parties’ 
efforts to regulate aspects of the sale transaction beyond the mere 
conveyance of the goods or services. 
* Associate Professor of Accounting, University of Vermont. 
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INTRODUCTION
 For decades, accrual-method taxpayers have accounted for 
sales of goods and services based primarily on their rights to re-
ceive payments or liabilities to make payments under contracts.1
They have relied on tax accounting rules—known as the all events 
tests—that evolved from the application of accrual methods to 
discrete transactions, which often called for straightforward ex-
changes of goods or services for payments.2 With greater frequency, 
these transactions now occur in complicated relationships with 
aspects of private regulation.3 Because private regulation ordinarily 
creates obligations to do more than simply tender goods or services 
in exchange for payment, it becomes challenging to respect the com-
plicated arrangements with meaningful applications of the all 
events tests.4
 Private regulation takes many forms. It generally involves 
the establishment, monitoring, and/or enforcement of standards by 
private, non-government actors.5 Private regulation might emerge 
to address social, environmental, or other concerns when govern-
ments have failed to act, private parties wish to forestall gov-
ernment regulation, or companies react to market pressures.6
For example, trade associations and nongovernmental organizations 
set many technical standards, promoting uniformity and inter-
changeability, and regulatory standards, which address social and 
environmental externalities, for market participants that exceed 
the requirements of local law.7 By its private nature, this type of 
governance allows organizations to develop and implement their 
1 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 538,
CAT. NO. 15068G, ACCOUNTING PERIODS AND METHODS 10–12 (2019), https:// 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p538--2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BWE-UXBY]. 
2 See infra Part I. 
3 See infra Part I. 
4 See infra Part I. 
5 See Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENV’T.
& ADMIN. L. 291, 298–300 (2014). 
6 See id. at 293–94; Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Implications of Private 
Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 117, 121 (2014) 
[hereinafter Implications].
7 See McAllister, supra note 5, at 301–06 (noting how codes establishing 
responsible business practices exist for almost every industry and commodity 
in the global marketplace). 
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own regulatory standards; however, these organizations lack the 
coercive power of government to enforce compliance with them.8
 Considerable private regulation occurs through self-
regulation.9 Individual firms often take steps, such as adopting 
codes of conduct, to regulate themselves and their suppliers.10 This 
self-regulation helps establish important performance expecta-
tions of suppliers that frequently exceed the requirements under 
public laws.11 For instance, contracts often become vehicles for 
bringing labor, safety, environmental, and other regulatory regimes 
into transactions between individual firms and among members 
of global supply chains.12 Whereas contracts have traditionally 
focused on exchanges of products and services, regulatory provi-
sions within contracts now address additional concerns about 
related processes.13 Thus, contracts regulate how parties will fulfill 
their promises.14 For example, a company might engage a service 
provider to analyze the company’s customer data, and their agree-
ment could require the service provider to abide by the company’s 
data security policy.15 The agreement fundamentally involves a 
sale of services, but it also seeks to regulate the service provider’s 
business practices.16
 Self-regulation also includes efforts to monitor and enforce 
compliance with the regulatory provisions in supplier contracts.17
Parties face “incentives to cheat” because compliance can increase 
operating costs, firms can often easily hide violations, and mar-
ket demands for changes in conduct might dissipate with the mere 
adoption of regulatory standards.18 Therefore, if they really intend 
to abide by regulatory standards, parties might undertake their 
8 See Implications, supra note 6, at 122. 
9 See McAllister, supra note 5, at 301. 
10 See id. at 306–07. 
11 See id. at 307; Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Govern-
ance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 156 (2013) [hereinafter Private Environmental 
Governance]. 
12 See Fabrizio Cafaggi, The Regulatory Functions of Transnational Commer-
cial Contracts: New Architectures, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1557, 1563–66 (2013). 
13 See id. at 1558–59. 
14 See, e.g., id.; William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 MINN.
L. REV. 1135, 1170 (2019). 
15 See McGeveran, supra note 14, at 1170. 
16 See id.
17 McAllister, supra note 5, at 313. 
18 Id. at 313–14. 
2021] THE ALL EVENTS TESTS 333 
own efforts to assess compliance through monitoring and to cor-
rect deviations through enforcement.19 Self-regulated enforcement 
might also make use of arbitration procedures to circumvent local 
courts and local law by resolving disputes through the selection 
of procedural and substantive rules of the parties’ choice.20 In 
order to monitor and enforce compliance, the service agreement 
above might require periodic third-party audits to assure the 
service provider’s compliance with the data security policy, and 
the parties might establish procedures to address potential se-
curity weaknesses.21
 Self-regulation often occurs in the context of long-term 
business relationships, including among established participants 
in global supply chains.22 Long-term relationships can affect how 
parties express their expectations in contracts and how closely 
they follow their contracts in practice.23 For instance, regulatory 
provisions might express expectations in broad standards rather 
than precise rules or terms in order to accommodate unknown 
future events.24 For example, the data security policy above might 
expect reasonable precautions against potential risks, which 
provides some flexibility in safeguarding information.25 The en-
forcement of performance expectations might then happen off 
19 See id. at 307–16; Private Environmental Governance, supra note 11, at 
137 (“Much of the enforcement of public and private environmental standards 
in some countries arises through private inspectors enforcing private certifi-
cation standards or supply chain contract requirements.”). 
20 See Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants Through Private Contracting: Codes 
of Vendor Conduct in Global Supply Chains as an Example, 57 AM. J. COMP.
L. 711, 714 (2009) (noting how international arbitration “show[s] a tendency 
toward westernization” rather than neutrality for global transactors). 
21 See McGeveran, supra note 14, at 1187–88. 
22 See Private Environmental Governance, supra note 11, at 157–58; see also
David Frydlinger et al., A New Approach to Contracts, HARVARD BUS. R. (Sept.–
Oct. 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/09/a-new-approach-to-contracts [https://perma 
.cc/AMY9-PQG4].
23 See Gillian K. Hadfield & Iva Bozovic, Scaffolding: Using Formal Con-
tracts to Support Informal Relations in Support of Innovation, 2016 WIS. L.
REV. 981, 992–94. 
24 See id. (discussing how “businesses looked to industry and relational 
norms to adapt to contingencies and respond to the behavior of their contract-
ing partners” instead of specific contract language); Ronald J. Gilson et al., 
Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, 
Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1390–91 (2010). 
25 See McGeveran, supra note 14, at 1176–79. 
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contract in order to preserve relationships—particularly in light 
of high costs of switching trading partners—which makes parties 
less likely to pursue formal damage claims when problems arise.26
Contracting parties might recognize that the prospect of informal 
sanctions—like a decision to take future business elsewhere or 
the reputational harm caused by a disclosure of nonconforming 
performance—can encourage compliance and promote coopera-
tive problem solving in established relationships.27 Thus, the 
risk posed to the reputations of both the company and its service 
provider from a breach of customer data28 might be enough to 
compel the parties to fix an identified security issue jointly 
without having to impose a contractually specified sanction, 
such as contract termination, for noncompliance.29
 The all events tests will approach income and expense 
recognition for transactions subject to self-regulation, like other 
situations, by accounting for unconditional rights and liabilities.30
As tests based on rights and liabilities, they must deal with the 
broadening scope of contractual obligations from the integration 
of regulatory aspects into commercial transactions and with the 
formal and informal responses to deviations from those require-
ments.31 The tests should acknowledge that compliance with 
process standards has become an integral part of contractual ar-
rangements whereas the means for achieving any such compli-
ance had previously been externally driven through tort claims 
by injured parties and administrative actions by governments.32
26 See Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 23, at 992, 994 (explaining how busi-
nesses, in non-innovative environments, “routinely faced unplanned-for con-
tingencies and the problem of relational adaptation”; however, “rather than 
resorting to contractual terms ... these businesses said they made little use of for-
mal contracting, rarely referred to formal contracts in dispute management, and 
they almost never litigated, or threatened to litigate, to enforce obligations.”). 
27 See Gilson et al., supra note 24, at 1392–94; McAllister, supra note 5, at 
314; Private Environmental Governance, supra note 11, at 137 (describing how 
enforcement of private environmental standards “occurs through shaming, 
boycotts, private inspections, contract terminations or non-renewals, and 
preferential purchasing”). 
28 See McGeveran, supra note 14, at 1152–53. 
29 See id. at 1158–59.
30 See infra Part I. 
31 See infra Part I. 
32 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1597; Fabrizio Cafaggi, The Many Features 
of Transnational Private Rule-Making: Unexplored Relationships Between Custom, 
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These regulatory provisions are now commonplace and changing 
business practices33 as they impose wide-ranging obligations, such 
as requiring suppliers to curb deforestation,34 provide their em-
ployees with paid family leave and paid sick and vacation time,35
or track sources of goods or materials with blockchain.36 The all 
events tests must also accommodate noncompliance and any re-
sponses to it. Suppliers do not always comply with regulatory pro-
visions, even if audited as part of certification programs, as they 
employ child labor and strip forests, for example, in violation of 
their commitments.37
 This Article considers the application of the all events 
tests to self-regulated transactions that incorporate regulatory 
provisions in contracts for the sale of goods or services.38 Part I 
exposes problems in applying the all events tests in the context 
of self-regulation.39 These problems originate from unresolved 
Jura Mercatorum and Global Private Regulation, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 875, 
891 (2015) (“This change is driven by the need for effective regulation across 
national jurisdictional boundaries when chain leaders outsource activities to 
suppliers located in different jurisdictions. Private standards are addressed 
to the [multinational corporation] and its whole supply chain linked via con-
tracts.”); Private Environmental Governance, supra note 11, at 136 (“Many 
corporations have adopted environmental management systems not because 
of government requirements but because their supply contracts require them 
to comply with a private standard.”). 
33 See Implications, supra note 6, at 128 (noting how “supply chain con-
tracting requirements are so widespread and influential that” the policies of 
large multinational corporations “are becoming the de facto regulatory floor 
for the use of many toxic chemicals”). 
34 See Justin Gillis, Companies Take Baton on Global Warming, INT’L N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/business/energy 
-environment/passing-the-baton-in-climate-change-efforts.html [https://perma.cc 
/KVP9-DB2T]. 
35 See Lauren Weber, Microsoft Presses Vendors on Leave, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 31, 2018, at B3. 
36 See Michael Corkery & Nathaniel Popper, From Farm to Blockchain: 
Walmart Tracks Its Lettuce, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2018/09/24/business/walmart-blockchain-lettuce.html [https://perma.cc 
/YAS2-66FQ]. 
37 See Peter Whoriskey, Chocolate Companies Sell ‘Certified Cocoa.’ But 




38 See infra Part I.  
39 See infra Part I. 
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issues under the all events tests that create uncertainty in many 
contexts; however, this Part illustrates how self-regulation in-
creases the uncertainty.40 In particular, Part I discusses how 
self-regulation interacts with conditions on payment obligations, 
satisfaction of performance obligations, and certainty about rights 
and liabilities.41 This Part also explores how self-regulation in-
fluences knowable information and its potential effect on accruals.42
In response to these problems, Part II proposes that the all 
events tests recognize an implied requirement of acceptance.43
This Part explains that, if rights and liabilities were conditioned 
on acceptance, the all events tests could readily handle conforming 
and nonconforming performances without ignoring the significance 
of self-regulation in modern commercial transactions.44
I. THE ALL EVENTS TESTS
 Two separate tests determine when a taxpayer accrues 
items of income and expense for tax purposes.45 One all events 
test generally requires income recognition when all events have 
occurred to fix a taxpayer’s right to receive the income and its 
amount is determinable with reasonable accuracy.46 Subject to 
economic performance requirements,47 the other all events test 
generally permits an expense deduction when all events have 
40 See infra Part I. 
41 See infra Part I. 
42 See infra Part I. 
43 See infra Part II. 
44 See infra Part II. 
45 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(A), 1.461-1(a)(2)(i). 
46 See I.R.C. § 451(b)(1)(C); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(A), 1.451-1(a). For 
certain taxpayers and items of income, the all events test is treated as satisfied 
no later than when a taxpayer includes income in its financial statement revenue. 
See I.R.C. § 451(b)(1). This earlier-of approach still requires that the taxpayer 
determine when its right becomes fixed and the amount is determinable with 
reasonable accuracy in order to identify the earlier occurrence. See id.
47 See I.R.C. § 461(h). The economic performance rules generally try to 
prevent a deduction before a taxpayer economically incurs a liability even if 
the taxpayer faces an unconditional obligation to pay it. See STAFF OF J. COMM.
ON TAX’N, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF 
THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 (Comm. Print 1984). Accordingly, the eco-
nomic performance rules generally prevent the all events test from being satisfied 
any earlier than when economic performance occurs. See I.R.C. § 461(h)(1). 
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occurred to fix the taxpayer’s liability to pay the expense and its 
amount is determinable with reasonable accuracy.48 Each of these 
two-part tests thus includes a fixed prong and an amount prong.49
A taxpayer must satisfy both prongs before satisfying a test and 
accruing an item.50
 The all events tests would naturally apply to the sale of 
goods or services in arrangements where contracting parties choose 
to self-regulate their activities. In fact, the same events would 
presumably satisfy the fixed prong of each test such that a buyer’s 
unconditional obligation to pay for goods or services should cor-
respond to the seller’s unconditional right to receive such pay-
ment.51 Although issues undoubtedly arise in applying the all 
events tests to any situation, the efforts of contracting parties to 
self-regulate amplify the challenges of determining when rights 
and liabilities become fixed and for holding the parties responsi-
ble for making that determination.52
A. The Absolute Standard for Fixed Rights and Liabilities 
 The fixed prongs of the all events tests contemplate that 
taxpayers will only take into account unconditional rights to in-
come and unconditional liabilities to pay.53 The tests ostensibly 
impose an absolute standard that rejects accruals based on likely, 
probable, or expected outcomes.54 The unconditional standard of 
48 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(A), 1.461-1(a)(2)(i). The all events test 
determines when a taxpayer may take a liability into account, and the taxpayer 
might account for the liability as an expense or capital expenditure. See Treas. 
Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(B). Accordingly, a taxpayer might take into account and 
capitalize the cost of acquired inventory. See id. To improve readability, the fol-
lowing discussions about timing will generically reference deducting an item as 
an expense even though a taxpayer might account for the liability differently. 
49 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(A), 1.461-1(a)(2)(i). 
50 See id.
51 See Rev. Rul. 98-39, 1998-2 C.B. 198, 199. 
52 See infra Section I.A. 
53 See United States v. Hughes Props., Inc., 476 U.S. 593, 600–01 (1986). 
54 See id.
Thus, to satisfy the all-events test, a liability must be “final and 
definite in amount,” Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner,
321 U.S. 281, 287 (1944), must be “fixed and absolute,” Brown v. 
Helvering, 291 U.S., at 201, and must be “unconditional,” Lucas v. 
North Texas Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11, 13 (1930). And one may say 
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the tests had originated when many trading arrangements were 
more straightforward than the complex contractual and business 
relationships seen today, such as those in modern global supply 
chains.55 As a result, the standard’s application has become less 
certain and less workable as taxpayers operate in increasingly 
complex environments.56
1. Conditional Payment Obligations 
 Conditions might affect whether a taxpayer has a fixed 
right or liability for purposes of the all events tests. A condition 
precedent represents an uncertain event that must occur before 
a right or liability can become fixed.57 Conditions precedent might 
include a third party’s approval of a sale or a creditor’s submission 
of a claim form.58 In contrast, a condition subsequent is an un-
certain event that, upon its occurrence, extinguishes a previously 
fixed right or liability.59 Thus, a return of goods by a customer 
that “the tax law requires that a deduction be deferred until ‘all 
the events’ have occurred that will make it fixed and certain.” 
Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 543 (1979). 
Id.
55 Cf. Cathy Hwang & Matthew Jennejohn, Deal Structure, 113 NW. U. L.
REV. 279, 283 (2018) (“[M]odern contracts are fundamentally different from 
the relatively simple contracts that motivated classic questions. A growing body 
of empirical scholarship has noted that modern contracts have grown sub-
stantially in complexity. They are longer, tackle more difficult issues, and are 
harder to read and understand.” (footnotes omitted)); Franklin G. Snyder & 
Ann M. Mirabito, The Death of Contracts, 52 DUQ. L. REV. 345, 376–81 (2014) 
(describing contract law as better suited for the 1850–1950 period, rather 
than modern times, because it presupposes resolving conflicts only through 
court systems, often with lay juries, and using rules and principles designed for 
irregular and informal contracting processes where “[p]arties routinely enter into 
agreements in careless, sloppy, and idiosyncratic ways, so that it is frequently 
difficult to tell if they have made a contract and, if so, what it requires”). 
56 See Glenn Walberg, Just Enough: Substantial Performance, Ministerial 
Acts and the All Events Tests for Income and Expense Accruals, 10 FLA. TAX
REV. 459, 460 (2010) [hereinafter Just Enough].
57 See Charles Schwab Corp. v. Comm’r, 107 T.C. 282, 293 (1996) (income 
accrual), aff’d, 161 F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 1998); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United 
States, 782 F.3d 1354, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (expense accrual). 
58 See Rosenthal v. Comm’r, 32 T.C. 225, 229 (1959) (third-party approval); 
United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 239, 244–45 (1987) (claim 
form submissions). 
59 See Charles Schwab, 107 T.C. at 293 (“conditions subsequent ... will termi-
nate an existing right to income, but the presence of which does not preclude 
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might represent a condition subsequent that would eliminate an 
existing right to income that arose from the sale of those goods 
to the customer.60 The all events tests generally defer recogni-
tion for a right or liability until the satisfaction of a condition 
precedent because the final event must have occurred to fix the 
right or liability.61 The tests then expect a taxpayer to account 
for the occurrence of any condition subsequent as a separate 
transaction that causes the loss of a fixed right or release of a 
fixed liability.62
 The all events tests generally rely on a conceptual distinc-
tion between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent, 
and the satisfaction of either type of condition seemingly de-
pends on the occurrence of isolated events.63 The tests are best 
suited for a single agreement that clearly identifies the effect of 
a condition on a payment obligation where an identifiable event 
either establishes a right or liability (e.g., a third-party approval) 
or extinguishes a right or liability (e.g., a product return).64 But 
taxpayers usually must apply the tests under less straightforward 
accrual of income”); Cooper Cmtys., Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 1408, 
1412 (W.D. Ark. 1987) (“This liability, however, is subject to being cut off by 
the default of the purchaser .... This type of ‘condition’ or ‘contingency’ could 
more appropriately be termed a condition subsequent acting to divest or ter-
minate payments.”). 
60 See Newhouse Broad. Corp. v. Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 178 (2000). 
61 See Burnham Corp. v. Comm’r, 90 T.C. 953, 956 (1988), aff’d, 878 F.2d 
86 (2d Cir. 1989). 
If existence of a liability depends on satisfaction of a condition 
precedent, the liability is not unconditionally fixed as required 
by the first requirement of the all events test. Liability does 
not in fact arise until the condition is satisfied. A taxpayer is, 
therefore, prevented from obtaining the benefit of a deduction 
for an expense that he has no liability to pay until some event, 
other than the passage of time, occurs. A liability subject to a 
condition subsequent, however, is definitely fixed, subject only to 
a condition which may cut off liability in the future. An accrual 
basis taxpayer having such a liability may deduct an expense 
for which it is presently liable. 
Id. (emphasis in original).
62 See United States v. Hughes Props., Inc., 476 U.S. 593, 606 (1986); J.J. 
Little & Ives Co. v. Comm’r, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 372, 392–93 (1966). 
63 See Charles Schwab, 107 T.C. at 293. 
64 See Rosenthal v. Comm’r, 32 T.C. 225, 228–29 (1959); see also Charles 
Schwab, 107 T.C. at 293–94. 
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circumstances, especially if they layer self-regulation onto their 
relationships.65
 To the extent self-regulation imposes conditions on pay-
ment obligations,66 those conditions might not fit neatly within 
the condition precedent or condition subsequent schemes.67 Un-
like a clear triggering event that creates or extinguishes a right 
or liability, a regulatory provision describes expectations about 
the manner of performance and often lacks an explicit connection 
to a payment obligation.68 Payment obligations usually arise un-
der contracts when parties perform as promised, and contracts 
often do not address the consequences of nonperformance.69 But 
the connection between a regulatory provision and payment ob-
ligation becomes most apparent in the event of noncompliance.70
For example, consider a regulatory provision that prohibits a 
seller of goods from using child labor.71 A contract would likely 
state the prohibition and the buyer’s obligation to pay for goods 
without revealing a connection between the prohibition and ob-
ligation even though the obligation to pay presumably depends, 
65 Cf. Snyder & Mirabito, supra note 55, at 387 (describing modern com-
merce as differing from the “one-shot, quasi-commercial relationships” of the 
past, from which contract law developed, where “individuals haggled with shop 
owners over prices and terms of sale, with idiosyncratic terms relating to 
payment, warranties, rights of return, and so on”). 
66 See id. at 372 (“When and how a term in a contract becomes a condition 
is matter of subtle reasoning ....”). 
67 See Charles Schwab, 107 T.C. at 293. 
68 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1568–69. 
69 See ZACHARY WOLFE, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7-184 (4th ed. 
2019).  
The law ... requir[es] that the parties express their expectations 
as to performance with considerable definiteness .... But the 
law does not require the parties to state what their expectations 
are in the event of breach and other remote contingencies, 
and such matters are often omitted from the agreement. 
Id.
70 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic 
Power in Auto Manufacturing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953, 965 n.42 
(2006) (describing how General Motor’s general terms and conditions require 
suppliers “to refrain from engaging in ‘corrupt business practices’ such as us-
ing child and prisoner labor.” (citation omitted)). 
71 Id.
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as a condition precedent or condition subsequent, on the type of 
labor used.72
 The conditional nature of a payment obligation, for tax 
purposes, might depend on whether a regulatory provision func-
tions as an express warranty or a performance obligation.73 For 
example, the seller above could commit to the labor standard 
with respect to the sale of goods as an express warranty about 
the quality of the goods.74 Goods carrying a warranty of being 
child labor free have a quality that can competitively distinguish 
them from other goods in the marketplace.75 The seller could 
breach that express warranty only if the buyer first accepts the 
goods,76 and the buyer’s acceptance would establish its obligation 
to pay the agreed upon contract price for the goods.77 The buyer 
could then offset the contract price or seek repayment for dam-
ages resulting from the breach of warranty.78 Therefore, a regu-
latory provision functioning as an express warranty looks like a 
condition subsequent for tax purposes because a failure to com-
ply reduces or extinguishes the payment obligation established 
by acceptance.79 Acceptance fixes the payment obligation irre-
spective of the seller’s compliance with the regulatory provision; 
the sale is completed albeit with goods of an inferior quality.80
 In contrast, compliance with a regulatory provision might 
become necessary to fix a payment obligation. As a performance 
obligation, the seller would commit to delivering goods that conform 
to the regulatory standard.81 Goods manufactured with child labor 
72 See Burnham Corp. v. Comm’r, 90 T.C., 956 (1988), aff’d, 878 F.2d 86 
(2d Cir. 1989). 
73 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1586–88 (describing how regulatory provi-
sions can function as express warranties as opposed to performance obligations). 
74 See U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (describing 
how “[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which 
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an 
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.”). 
75 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1586–87. 
76 See U.C.C. § 2-714(1); id. § 2-714 cmt. 1; Timothy Davis, UCC Breach of 
Warranty and Contract Claims: Clarifying the Distinction, 61 BAYLOR L. REV.
783, 789–91 (2009). 
77 See U.C.C. § 2-607(1). 
78 See U.C.C. § 2-717. 
79 See Davis, supra note 76, at 789–90. 
80 See id.
81 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1586. 
342 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:329 
differ from goods manufactured without child labor, and the seller 
could not substitute one for the other in fulfilling its promise.82
A delivery of unaccepted, nonconforming goods would thus cre-
ate a breach of contract claim.83 Because the seller’s tendering of 
nonconforming goods would not fulfill its promised performance, 
the seller could not hold the buyer to its promises in the contract, 
and the buyer would have no obligation to pay for the goods.84 For 
tax purposes, a regulatory provision functioning as a performance 
obligation looks like a condition precedent if the seller must de-
liver conforming goods in order to fix the payment obligation.85
Therefore, very different tax consequences might arise depend-
ing on whether the buyer accepts or rejects goods86 and whether 
the contract establishes a regulatory provision as a warranty or 
performance obligation.87 Unfortunately, the contract would likely 
state the prohibition without clarifying its status as an express 
warranty or performance obligation given that contracts fre-
quently incorporate a variety of regulatory standards, such as a 
corporate code of conduct, by reference.88
 Self-regulation also creates ongoing process-related expec-
tations for contracting parties that differ from the isolated events 
often associated with conditions under the all events tests.89 Parties 
82 Cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Commentary, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of 
Modularity and the Waning of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1229–30 
(2006) (noting the collapse of any distinction between a physical product and a 
contract governing its exchange insofar as, from an economic perspective, the con-
tract terms become part of “a unified set of disparate features” of the product). 
83 See U.C.C. § 2-711(1); id. § 2-711 cmt. 1 (“The remedies listed here are 
those available to a buyer who has not accepted the goods or who has justifi-
ably revoked his acceptance. The remedies available to a buyer with regard to 
goods finally accepted appear in [U.C.C. § 2-714] dealing with breach in regard 
to accepted goods.”). 
84 See id. § 2-711(1); id. § 2-607 cmt. 1; Davis, supra note 76, at 792–94. 
85 See Davis, supra note 76, at 794–96. 
86 See id.
87 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1585–86. 
88 See id.; see generally U.C.C. § 2-313(2) (“It is not necessary to the crea-
tion of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as ‘warrant’ 
or ‘guarantee’ or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty ....”). 
89 See Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and 
Network Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 
566–68 (2015) [hereinafter Beyond Relational Contracts]. 
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might enter into a legally unenforceable long-term supply agree-
ment, for example, to establish an overall framework for a rela-
tionship and then create enforceable obligations by executing 
purchase orders for smaller transactions within that relationship.90
A buyer’s willingness to continue a long-term relationship generally 
depends on its overall satisfaction with the supplier’s performance 
rather than the supplier’s fulfillment of its legal obligations un-
der a specific purchase order.91 If a long-term supply agreement 
prohibits any use of child labor at the supplier’s facilities even in 
fulfilling orders from the supplier’s other customers, then the buyer 
would likely expect ongoing compliance by the supplier.92 But 
the all events tests might look for a connection between compliance 
and the payment obligation under a specific purchase order. 
Whether a condition might depend on compliance before, during, 
or after performance remains unclear because the purchase or-
der is just part of a complex, long-term relationship.93
 A long-term relationship could further complicate any 
conditional relationship between a compliance expectation and a 
payment obligation.94 Because a claim of breach often ends a trad-
ing relationship, a buyer is less likely to assert a right to mone-
tary damages from a long-term supplier than from a seller in a 
one-off transaction.95 Generally, in long-term relationships, a 
preferred strategy might leave some portion of nonconforming 
performances unpunished due to the potential for mistakes in 
attributing deviations to opportunistic behavior and the likeli-
hood of retaliation for imposing undeserved sanctions.96 More 
specifically, when regulatory expectations are not met, a buyer 
is often more concerned about correcting the process than impos-
ing a penalty for noncompliance.97 As a result, what ostensibly 
90 See id.
91 See id. at 567. 
92 See id. at 566.
93 See id.
94 See id. at 570. 
95 See id.
96 See Gilson et al., supra note 24, at 1395. 
97 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1611 (“[T]he main objective of remedies 
[for regulatory noncompliance] is to restore compliance rather than to provide 
compensation. Cooperative remedies for regulatory non-compliance may therefore 
also affect the resolution of strictly commercial disputes.” (footnote omitted)); 
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looks like a condition on payment in a contract might actually 
operate as a condition for continued participation in an overall 
trading relationship.98 So contracting parties might not allow 
events, which could otherwise affect entitlements to payments, 
to actually change payment obligations because the parties pre-
fer to use regulatory provisions to shape and reinforce desirable 
outcomes in long-term relationships.99
2. Performance Under a Contract 
 Performance plays an outsized role in the administration 
of the all events tests.100 A party’s performance under a contract 
often serves as the event that arguably fixes a right or liabil-
ity.101 For instance, the Internal Revenue Service (Service)—
with some acceptance by the courts102—characterizes a right to 
income as fixed upon the earliest of when required performance 
occurs, payment becomes due, or payment is made.103 Similarly, 
the Service regards a liability as fixed upon the earliest of when 
an event, such as required performance, occurs to fix the liability 
or when payment becomes due.104 Consequently, for purposes of 
Lin, supra note 20, at 726 (“Implementation of vendor codes ... does not only 
have a remedial dimension but a preventative one.”); see also Beyond Rela-
tional Contracts, supra note 89, at 583–84. 
The reason for a breach influences [an original equipment manu-
facturer’s] response. Breaches due to one-off manufacturing 
glitches are largely ignored, unless they are frequent. Breaches 
due to systematic production problems (even large ones) that 
the buyer thinks can be remedied are initially met with offers 
of technical assistance, sometimes at the buyer’s expense. And 
opportunistic breaches or breaches caused by operational dif-
ficulties that cannot be remedied are typically met with the 
harshest responses, including termination for cause. 
Id. (footnote omitted).
98 See Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 89, at 584. 
99 See id. 
100 See Rev. Rul. 74-607, 1974-2 C.B. 149, 150; Rev. Rul. 2007-3, 2007-1 
C.B. 350, 351. 
101 See Rev. Rul. 74-607, 1974-2 C.B. 150; Rev. Rul. 2007-3, 2007-1 C.B. 351. 
102 See, e.g., Charles Schwab Corp. v. Comm’r, 107 T.C. 282, 292 (1996) 
(“The taxpayer’s right to receive income is fixed upon the earliest of (1) the 
taxpayer’s receipt of payment, (2) the contractual due date, or (3) the taxpay-
er’s performance.”), aff’d, 161 F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 1998). 
103 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-607, 1974-2 C.B. 150. 
104 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2007-3, 2007-1 C.B. 351. 
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the all events tests, the performance of contractual obligations 
fixes many rights to income and liabilities to pay.105 So taxpayers 
should presumably anticipate a straightforward application of the 
all events tests that often fixates on when parties have performed. 
 Unfortunately, existing authorities and guidance provide 
little indication about what constitutes performance for purpos-
es of the all events tests.106 In particular, they do not clarify 
when “close enough” to contractual promises is sufficient for per-
formance to occur under the tests.107 This lack of clarity becomes 
significant for agreements with regulatory provisions because 
they often task contracting parties with additional responsibili-
ties or subject them to certain limitations, which might redefine 
performance expectations.108 For example, as part of a buyer’s 
initiative to become carbon neutral, a regulatory provision might 
require its supplier to manufacture goods using only electricity 
from renewable sources.109 Whether and how this requirement 
might affect the supplier’s performance (and correspondingly, 
the satisfaction of the all events tests for the buyer and supplier) 
remains unclear. 
 A seller can tender goods or services as generally described in 
a contract without fulfilling all process-related requirements.110
For example, the supplier above could deliver goods that meet 
their required physical specifications, even if the supplier used 
electricity from nonrenewable sources.111 Whether the supplier 
has a fixed right to income, and the buyer has a fixed liability to 
105 See Schneer v. Comm’r, 97 T.C. 643, 650 (1991) (“[T]he prerequisite of 
performance of the services prior to any liability on the part of the obligor is 
an essential to satisfying the all-events test. The right to receive income can-
not become fixed before the obligor has an obligation to pay.”). 
106 See Snyder & Mirabito, supra note 55, at 390–92. 
107 See id. at 391–92 (noting how an assumption that parties are satisfied 
with “close enough” under the substantial performance doctrine of contract 
law does not fit with “demands [for] absolute, strict adherence to standards” 
in modern lean production systems and supply chains). 
108 See Private Environmental Governance, supra note 11, at 156–58. 
109 See id. at 156–57 (explaining Wal-Mart’s energy efficiency requirements 
for its suppliers); Verónica H. Villena & Dennis A. Gioia, A More Sustainable 
Supply Chain, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2020, https://hbr.org/2020/03/a-more 
-sustainable-supply-chain [https://perma.cc/2HEY-NWTK]. 
110 See Just Enough, supra note 56, at 460, 470. 
111 See, e.g., Villena & Gioia, supra note 109 (confirming that many com-
panies may meet cost, quality, and delivery goals, but not social or environ-
mental standards). 
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pay might depend on whether the delivery of those nonconform-
ing goods constitutes performance under the all events tests.112
 The all events tests never specify whether the focus on re-
quired performance means the parties must satisfy all contractual 
obligations in order to fix their respective rights and liabilities.113
Theoretically, the tests could assess the occurrence of required 
performance in a manner akin to either the exactness of the per-
fect tender rule of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),114 the 
reasonableness of the substantial performance and material breach 
doctrines of the common law,115 or the tolerance of a more forgiving 
112 With respect to the liability to pay, the economic performance rules 
might regard simply delivering the physical items as sufficient for economic 
performance to occur. See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(d)(2)(i) (“[E]conomic performance 
occurs as the services or property is provided.”). Those rules complement the 
all events test and generally try to prevent a deduction before a taxpayer eco-
nomically incurs a liability rather than identify the particular events that make 
the taxpayer liable. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N., 98TH CONG., GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT 
OF 1984 (Comm. Print 1984). The rules could reasonably meet that objective 
by postponing a deduction for an otherwise fixed future performance obligation 
until services or property are provided, see H.R. REP. NO. 98-861, at 871 (1984) 
(Conf. Rep.), even if certain other contractual obligations remain unfulfilled 
at that later date. Consequently, the “as provided” standard of section 461(h) 
suggests the economic performance rules can accept something less stringent 
than the required performance expected under the all events tests. See Rev. 
Rul. 74-607, 1974-2 C.B. 150; Rev. Rul. 2007-3, 2007-1 C.B. 350. 
113 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.461-1(a)(2)(i)–(ii). 
114 See Midwest Mobile Diagnostic Imaging, L.L.C. v. Dynamics Corp., 965 
F. Supp. 1003, 1010–11 (W.D. Mich. 1997) aff’d, 165 F.3d 27 (6th Cir. 1998). 
Under § 2-601 [of the Uniform Commercial Code], a buyer has 
the right to reject, “if the goods or tender of delivery fail in any 
respect to conform to the contract ....” Known as the “perfect 
tender” rule, this standard requires a very high level of con-
formity. Under this rule, the buyer may reject a seller’s tender 
for any trivial defect, whether it be in the quality of the goods, 
the timing of performance, or the manner of delivery. 
Id.; accord H.J. Heinz Co. v. Granger, 147 F. Supp. 664, 671 (W.D. Penn. 
1956) (“[T]he principle is clear that where the parties to a contract have really 
made payment dependent upon the happening of some condition, their agreement 
should not be disregarded for tax purposes.”). 
115 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 237 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1981) 
(noting the similarity of asking whether a material failure of performance has 
occurred or whether substantial performance has occurred); accord Levert v. 
Comm’r, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 910, 917 (1989).  
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standard.116 Without having endorsed a specific approach, appli-
cations of the tests indicate a willingness to accept some devia-
tions from contract terms in evaluating whether performance has 
occurred.117 Consequently, unless a party asserts that a particular 
deviation nullifies its liability under an agreement,118 the all events 
tests might disregard some degree of noncompliance in finding 
that a party performed as required. 
 If a party tenders goods or services but deviates from re-
quirements imposed through self-regulation efforts, then an all 
events test might justify its disregard for certain unfulfilled con-
tractual obligations by characterizing them as ministerial, pro-
cedural, or mechanical acts (collectively ‘ministerial acts’).119 For 
purposes of applying the all events tests, courts and the Service 
have dismissed the nonperformance of ministerial acts in finding 
fixed rights and liabilities.120 Unfortunately, their findings pro-
vide little explanation about how tests purporting to demand the 
occurrence of “all events” can ignore unfulfilled contractual obli-
gations.121 Occasionally, they instead rationalize that ministerial 
[P]etitioners did not become unconditionally liable for the full 
amounts of the contract prices until the contractor completed, 
at least in substantial part, its duties under the contracts. Until 
that time, the possibility remained that a “material failure” of 
performance would excuse petitioners’ refusal to pay .... We find 
that the parties contemplated significant performance by the 
contractor prior to the time petitioners were required to make 
full payment of the contract prices. 
Id.
116 Accord I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. 1999-1134 (undated) (describing a disa-
greement within the Service, in the context of claim submissions for coopera-
tive advertising, about satisfying the all events test through the compliance 
with all terms of a contract versus through the performance of the designated 
services in the contract). 
117 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2003-10, 2003-1 C.B. 289 (Situation 3) (finding a fixed 
right to income upon the mistaken shipment of the wrong quantity of goods). 
118 See Dixie Pine Prods. Co. v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 516, 519 (1944) (holding 
that a taxpayer cannot claim a deduction for a “fixed and certain” liability 
while simultaneously contesting the fact of its liability). 
119 Just Enough, supra note 56, at 473. 
120 See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 293, 314 (2000) (“A li-
ability can be fixed even if there are procedural or ministerial steps that still 
have to occur before payment.”), aff’d, 484 F.3d 731 (5th Cir. 2007). 
121 See Just Enough, supra note 56, at 473–80. 
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acts deal with minor,122 insubstantial,123 or nonessential124 matters 
that—unlike the primary125 or substantial126 actions contemplated 
by agreements—cannot prevent the fixing of a right or liability even 
though they remain unperformed.127 In essence, courts and the 
Service often allow the events most directly related to providing 
goods or services to drive income and expense recognition.128
 As a result, a taxpayer might have a fixed right to receive or 
liability to make payment under a contract despite the nonperfor-
mance of a ministerial act that the contract expressly designates as 
a term and condition for payment.129 Thus, one might expect a min-
isterial act characterization for a boilerplate, compliance-with-laws 
122 See Exxon Mobil, 114 T.C. at 319 (regarding a lease provision as “min-
isterial and perfunctory”); Schneider v. Comm’r, 65 T.C. 18, 28 (1975) (“only 
the ministerial act of computation remained to be done”), acq., 1976-2 C.B. 2; 
I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2009-03-079 (Oct. 8, 2008) (“[R]emaining minor or 
ministerial duties ... do not delay accrual.”). 
123 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-29-114 (Apr. 27, 1981) (“[m]inisterial functions 
are not substantial conditions”); I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. 1992 WL 1354886 
(Mar. 14, 1992) (“no substantive contingency remains”). 
124 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. 2001-04-011 (Oct. 19, 2000) (“The claim filing 
itself is ministerial, that is, it is not essential to the process of fixing the lia-
bility.”); I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. 1993 WL 1468075 (Apr. 30, 1993). 
125 See Charles Baloian Co. v. Comm’r, 68 T.C. 620, 627 (1977) (distinguishing 
an approval, as “simply a ministerial act,” from the “primary substantive 
considerations and decisions”), nonacq., 1978-2 C.B. 3; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
81-29-114 (Apr. 27, 1981) (“not substantial conditions”). 
126 See Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Comm’r, 90 T.C. 26, 33 (1988) (“Far from being 
a ministerial act, the passage of title and risk of loss to the buyer constitutes 
the very heart of the transaction and is the sine qua non to petitioner’s right 
to receive payment.”); Challenge Publ’ns, Inc. v. Comm’r, 845 F.2d 1541, 1544 
(9th Cir. 1988) (describing a non-ministerial contractual requirement as a 
“legally significant moment”); Rev. Rul. 2003-3, 2003-1 C.B. 252 (noting how 
the approvals of tax refunds “involves substantive review”); I.R.S. Chief Couns. 
Mem. 2013-43-01F (Sept. 18, 2013) (“A ministerial act is one ‘performed with-
out the independent exercise of discretion or judgement.’” (quoting BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009))). 
127 See Dally v. Comm’r, 227 F.2d 724, 727 (9th Cir. 1955). 
128 See Hallmark Cards, 90 T.C. at 33; I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 2013-43-
01F (Sept. 18, 2013). 
129 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2003-10-003 (Oct. 30, 2002) (“Even if the 
terms of the sales agreement made acceptance of the system a condition prec-
edent to the right to receive income, ... [it] is merely a ministerial act, and is not 
required to establish Taxpayer’s right to the income under the all-events test.”). 
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provision, which requires contracting parties to obey local, state, 
and federal laws.130 Such legal compliance might appear of minor 
importance when compared to providing the goods or services speci-
fied by the contract. Accordingly, the all events tests might rea-
sonably treat required performance as occurring when such goods 
or services are provided even if a party has violated a local noise 
ordinance, state zoning law, or federal tax regulation. 
 However, as contracting parties assume responsibility to 
self-regulate their activities, it becomes more difficult to dismiss 
their obligations as ministerial acts.131 Instead of broadly refer-
encing compliance with laws, contracts frequently require com-
pliance with specific laws, industry standards, codes of conduct, 
quality manuals, and environmental handbooks.132 In particular, 
procurement contracts of multinational companies often rely on 
specific compliance obligations to impose international or home-
country laws and standards on members of global supply chains.133
For example, many buyers require their global suppliers to adhere 
to environmental requirements, including obligations to reduce 
emissions and energy usage.134 Although a buyer might only re-
quire its suppliers to comply with their respective local envi-
ronmental laws, many contractual requirements exceed those of 
domestic laws and adopt the standards of the buyer’s home-
country laws or of private standard setters, such as the Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization.135 Notably, the decision 
and effort to self-regulate a specific activity or behavior suggests 
130 See, e.g., Doshi v. Gen. Cable Corp., 386 F. Supp. 3d 815, 829 (E.D. Ky. 
2019) (“The vague nature of this sentence and its borderline boilerplate quality” 
states “compliance ... with federal, state and local laws.”); accord Morning 
Star Packing Co. et. al, v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2020-142 (“The credit agree-
ments[, with covenants to comply with all laws, do not] specify which laws or 
regulations must be complied with .... Accordingly, we conclude that the gen-
eralized obligations found in the credit agreements do not establish the fact of 
the partnerships’ liability [under the all events test] ....”). 
131 See Implications, supra note 6, at 121, 129–30 (providing examples of 
how companies are self-regulating). 
132 See Lin, supra note 20, at 720–22; Beyond Relational Contracts, supra
note 89, at 567–68. 
133 See Lin, supra note 20, at 715–16. 
134 See Private Environmental Governance, supra note 11, at 156–57. 
135 See id. at 156. 
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that at least one party finds the obligation important rather 
than an insubstantial or nonessential ministerial act.136
 As the terms and conditions of contracts move from general 
to specific compliance obligations, they start aligning more closely 
with basic expectations about performance.137 Multinational com-
panies regard vendor-conduct obligations as valuable tools for 
satisfying consumer demands about social and environmental as-
pects of goods and services and for managing costs and risks as-
sociated with the threat posed by disreputable behavior within a 
global supply chain.138 Thus companies enjoy considerable benefits 
from marketing items produced, for example, through sustainable 
processes and prefer to avoid the considerable risks presented by 
processes that employ sweatshop practices.139 Moreover, a supply 
chain’s adoption of specific regulatory requirements can help differ-
entiate its products from those of competing supply chains.140 These 
benefits suggest that a taxpayer might pursue self-regulation 
efforts in furtherance of its profit-seeking activities, rather than 
for purely benevolent reasons.141 Thus, a specific compliance obli-
gation might be closely tied to a “primary” activity of providing 
goods or services and potentially inseparable from the performance 
evaluated under the all events tests. 
 For example, a taxpayer’s contract for the delivery of goods 
might obligate a supplier to abide by ethical standards, as speci-
fied in a code of conduct, for the treatment of its production-line 
employees.142 In that situation, the all events test would need to 
136 See id. at 173. 
137 See, e.g., Lin, supra note 20, at 717–19 (describing codes of vendor conduct 
that require certain labor standards to be upheld during production processes). 
138 See id. at 717–20. 
139 See id. at 718–19. 
140 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1564. 
141 See Implications, supra note 6, at 123–25; see also Private Environmen-
tal Governance, supra note 11, at 147 (characterizing standard setting as pri-
vate environmental guidance “so long as it induces a private entity to achieve 
a traditionally governmental objective ... or to serve a traditionally govern-
mental function” regardless of the motivation for doing so). 
142 See Lin, supra note 20, at 717 (noting how code of conduct standards 
for labor “generally include topics concerning child labor, forced labor, health 
and safety measures in workplaces, freedom of association and right to collec-
tive bargaining, discrimination, working hours, and compensation”); id. at 
720 (describing frequent references to International Labor Organization Labor 
2021] THE ALL EVENTS TESTS 351 
determine whether the taxpayer could have a fixed liability to pay 
if the supplier delivered goods but violated a standard during 
production.143 That determination depends in part on the scope 
of required performance, which might include perceptions of sepa-
rate performance obligations (e.g., performance required two ac-
tivities: the ethical treatment of employees and the delivery of the 
goods), comprehensive performance obligations (e.g., performance 
through the delivery of goods could only occur if the goods met 
both physical specifications and intangible ethical-production at-
tributes), significant relationships between obligations (e.g., non-
performance of the ethical treatment is excused as a ministerial 
aspect of a primary activity rather than as a freestanding sec-
ondary activity), etc. In short, the taxpayer must confront a fun-
damental question about what constitutes required performance 
under the all events test even though existing authorities and 
guidance provides little help in evaluating how integral regula-
tory provisions are to performance expectations.144
 Unfortunately, responses to noncompliance might indicate 
that regulatory provisions have varying connections to perfor-
mance.145 For example, a discovery that toxic substances were 
used by a supplier in the processing of food items, where such 
use was legal but violated the safety requirements established 
in codes of conduct or industry standards, might lead a buyer to 
demand product withdrawals or other corrective actions for de-
livered items.146 In that instance, the buyer’s response indicates 
that regulatory compliance was integral to performance.147 On 
Conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the UN Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child in codes of vendor conduct). 
143 See Rev. Rul. 2007-3, 2007-1 C.B. 350 (“[A]ll the events have occurred 
that establish the fact of the liability when (1) the event fixing the liability, 
whether that be the required performance or other event, occurs ....”); Villena 
& Gioia, supra note 109 (describing a study that discovered many suppliers 
in the networks of sustainability leaders supply chains “were violating the 
standards that the MNCs expected them to adhere to”). 
144 See Just Enough, supra note 56, at 480 (“[T]he anomaly provides little 
guidance but awkwardly forces taxpayers to decide what contractual require-
ments, which were important enough to include in the contract, are too in-
substantial to take into account in applying the all events tests.”). 
145 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1576–77. 
146 See id. at 1596. 
147 See id.
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the other hand, the supplier could have alternatively violated 
working conditions standards, such as having employees exceed 
a maximum number of working hours in a week during the pro-
cessing of the items. In that event, the buyer would more likely 
seek process-related changes for future production without insisting 
that the supplier take corrective actions, like product withdrawals, 
for the delivered items.148 The forward-looking response suggests a 
weaker connection between the regulatory provision and the 
performance expectations for the delivered items.149
 Performance could also depend on the extent of regulatory 
compliance. A contract might incorporate regulatory aspects by 
requiring a supplier’s certification under standards established 
by a third party.150 Some certification schemes, like those in the 
field of food safety, “identify different levels of compliance by using 
a metric, which correlates the choice of remedies to the serious-
ness of non-compliance.”151 The varying degrees of compliance 
identifiable by a certifier stands in contrast to the all-or-nothing 
approach that a court follows in distinguishing between a mate-
rial and immaterial breach while assessing performance under a 
contract.152 No guidance indicates whether the all events tests 
would assess performance from a degree-of-compliance or an all-
or-nothing approach in identifying fixed rights and liabilities for 
tax purposes.153
 Finally, considerations of performance might note that con-
tracting parties sometimes tolerate or make off-contract adjust-
ments for deviations from regulatory obligations.154 In preserving 
an ongoing relationship, a party might willingly make these ad-
justments on certain occasions even if the party were unwilling 
to commit itself in a contract to make them.155 The all events tests 
arguably might find tolerance or adjustments for noncompliance 
148 See id. at 1596–97. 
149 See id. at 1596–99. 
150 See id. at 1601. 
151 Id. at 1607. 
152 See id.
153 See Just Enough, supra note 56, at 460–61, 471. 
154 See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the 
Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1808 
(1996) [hereinafter Merchant Law].
155 See id.
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throughout a course of dealings as an indication that noncon-
forming performance can establish fixed rights and liabilities for 
tax purposes.156 However, it is difficult to justify how occasional 
informal actions, which contradict contract terms, might estab-
lish fixed rights and liabilities for this purpose if the parties could 
only seek enforcement of their actual contractual obligations.157
 As taxpayers continue to self-regulate the processes em-
ployed to produce goods and provide services, the all events tests 
will need to address how performance occurs under self-imposed 
regulatory provisions.158 In some respects, clarification is needed 
about whether, in finding fixed rights and liabilities, the tests 
will treat a taxpayer’s failure to perform as promised as being 
equivalent to a taxpayer’s fulfillment of its promises.159 In the 
156 See Rev. Rul. 2003-10, 2003-1 C.B. 290 (questioning how a course of 
dealings might affect an analysis under the all events test with respect to 
defective products). 
157 See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: 
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1724, 1781 (2001) [hereinafter Cotton Industry].
There is suggestive evidence that cotton transactors may view 
themselves as conducting their everyday interactions accord-
ing to a set of flexible understandings that requires them to 
make many adjustments, and ignore minor deviations in ways 
not required by their contract’s written provisions, yet pre-
serves their unfettered right to insist on strict performance of 
their contract when they think their contracting partner is 
behaving badly. 
Id.; Merchant Law, supra note 154, at 1800 (explaining how a party might 
invoke the dispute-resolution terms in a written contract, which were intended 
for a neutral third party to apply, if the parties cannot preserve their rela-
tionship by cooperatively resolving the dispute themselves). 
158 See Glenn Walberg, Constructive Conditions and the All Events Test, 62 
TAX LAW. 433, 438 [hereinafter Constructive Conditions] (noting the unclear 
history behind the due, paid, or earned standard for a taxpayer’s fixed right 
to income). 
159 Cf. Snyder & Mirabito, supra note 55, at 409. 
 A party who wants to be paid even though it has installed the 
wrong brand of product can protect itself by inserting a clause 
that says "or equivalent." Parties are free to include clauses 
that allow them to be paid even though there are defects. If 
parties choose not to indicate when they will be happy to 
agree to something less than what was bargained for, it is dif-
ficult to see why courts should bail them out ....  
Id.
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meantime, taxpayers have little guidance about when performance 
occurs if contracting parties voluntarily regulate their activities. 
3. Virtual Certainty About Obligations 
 The all events tests obsess over certainty in a taxpayer’s 
rights and liabilities irrespective of their legal enforceability.160
For example, in the context of deductions, the all events test dis-
tinguishes certainty about the taxpayer’s liability to pay from 
certainty about whether the taxpayer will make payment.161 By 
emphasizing the fact of liability, the all events test prevents a 
taxpayer from claiming a deduction if doubt exists that the tax-
payer will ever become liable.162 However, if liability is certain, 
then the test allows a deduction despite questions about whether 
the taxpayer might ever pay as a result of factors such as unen-
forceability.163 The all events test thus seeks to identify an obli-
gation where the fact of liability is certain even if not supported 
by a legally enforceable claim.164
 This approach deals with unenforceable obligations that 
arise in various contexts.165 For instance, it helps taxpayers account 
160 See TransCalifornia Oil Co. v. Comm’r, 37 B.T.A. 119, 127 (1938) (“The 
accruability test of a debt is not certainty of payment, but rather certainty of 
its liability ....”), nonacq. in part, 1941-2 C.B. 24. 
161 See id.
162 See Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400, 406 (5th Cir. 
1969); S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 497, 634 (1980) (“This require-
ment prevents the deduction of an expenditure that might never be made.”). 
163 See Helvering v. Russ. Fin. & Constr. Corp., 77 F.2d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 
1935) (“The existence of an absolute liability is necessary; absolute certainty 
that it will be discharged by payment is not.”). 
164 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 252, 257 (Ct. Cl. 
1976) (en banc), acq., 1996-2 C.B. 1; Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Comm’r, 30 T.C. 
295, 298 (1958), nonacq., 1958-2 C.B. 9, aff’d, 266 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1959); 
Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Comm’r, 82 T.C. 143, 151 (1984), acq., 1996-2 C.B. 1. 
165 See, e.g., Flamingo Resort, Inc. v. United States, 664 F.2d 1387, 1390 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (finding a fixed right to receive income attributable to gambling mark-
ers that, as instruments to advance money for betting, were void under state law); 
Volvo Cars of N. Am., Inc. v. United States, 80 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6094 (M.D.N.C. 
1997) vacated and remanded on other issues, 571 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 2009). 
The court acknowledges that the agreement was unenforceable 
without the requisite signatures .... The court finds, however, that 
whether the settlement was legally binding does not necessarily 
govern whether all events necessary to establish liability had oc-
curred in 1990 such that Volvo could claim the deduction in 1990. 
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for income and expense items that arise from unenforceable obli-
gations in illegal or invalid agreements.166 In that context, the 
all events tests might find a fixed right or liability based upon 
the occurrence of agreed upon events even though no court would 
compel a party to perform as promised.167
 The focus on certainty in rights and liabilities similarly 
enables the tests to account for unenforceable obligations under 
valid statutory provisions and lawful agreements.168 For exam-
ple, the tests might recognize fixed rights or liabilities that are 
legally unenforceable because they are not yet payable (i.e., 
amounts due but not payable).169 But the tests can also recognize 
fixed rights and liabilities that are unenforceable because no le-
gal obligation exists yet.170 Essentially the occurrence of certain 
events might make a right or liability certain, although those events 
Id.; I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. 2002-36-007 (May 23, 2002) (noting how, “in the 
absence of such executed forms, there must be some act or acts on the part of 
taxpayer that clearly evidence its intent to fix its tax liability”). 
166 See, e.g., Flamingo Resort, 664 F.2d at 1390; Volvo Cars, 80 A.F.T.R.2d 
(RIA) 6094; I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. 2002-36-007. 
167 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,536 (Oct. 15, 1980) (“[I]f the parties 
agree that the obligation will be fixed when an event happens, the obligation will 
be fixed when the event happens even though it is not legally enforceable.”). 
168 See Grand Ave. Motor Co. v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 423, 425 (D. 
Minn. 1954) (noting certainty of liability as the standard of the accruability 
test of a debt). 
169 See id. (“It is also clear that the terms ‘fixed’ and ‘determined’, as so used 
are not synonymous with ‘presently payable.’”). 
170 See Houchin v. Comm’r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1248 (2006). 
Assuming arguendo that delivery is required for a contract to 
take effect under Colorado law and that delivery did not occur 
until 1999, the above-mentioned provisions of the settlement 
agreement cause the effective date of the contract to be in 
1998, and therefore the all-events test was satisfied in 1998. 
Id.; Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400, 406 (5th Cir. 1969). 
There is no contingency in this case as to the fact of liability 
itself; the only contingency relates to when the liability will 
arise. To be sure, technically, the [legal] liability is ‘created’ 
by the event of the retirement of a particular plane; if a plane 
lasted forever there would be no liability. But taxation has 
been called a ‘practical field’.... If there is any doubt whether 
the liability will occur courts have been loath to interfere with 
the Commissioner’s discretion is disallowing a deduction .... But 
here there is no doubt at all that the liability will occur since 
airplanes, like human beings, regrettably must cease to function. 
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
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are not sufficient to create a legally recognized right or liability.171
Therefore, a taxpayer might account for rights and liabilities es-
tablished for tax purposes before they come into legal existence.172
 Accounting for unenforceable rights and liabilities presents 
a challenge, particularly where they exist for tax purposes before 
they arise under a contract or statute.173 Whereas legal enforce-
ability evokes a seemingly bright-line standard, questioning the 
certainty of legally unenforceable rights and liabilities invites an 
ambiguous search for practical solutions.174 As explained by the 
Court of Claims: 
The “all events” test thus allows deductions when the taxpayer 
has a special kind of knowledge which gives him enough facts 
to demonstrate the absolute necessity of paying an expense at 
some future date without regard to such matters as actual 
payment taking place, existence of legal liability, or accrual.175
Essentially, the all events tests occasionally direct taxpayers to 
account for rights and liabilities about which they are certain 
but for which they have no legal entitlement or responsibility.176
 Questions about taxpayer certainty have cropped up most 
prominently with respect to deducting payroll taxes for earned, but 
unpaid, compensation.177 An employer might become uncondition-
ally liable to pay employees for work performed during Year 1.178
But the employer’s responsibility to remit payroll taxes might not 
legally arise until the employer actually pays the employees in 
Year 2.179 Given its fixed liability in Year 1 to pay the employees, 
171 See Houchin, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1248 (finding that a settlement agree-
ment’s date of effectiveness satisfied the all events test regardless of the legally 
enforceable delivery date). 
172 See id.
173 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 252, 273 (Ct. Cl. 1976) 
(en banc) (Hastie, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority for disregarding stat-
utes and regulations when applying the case to unenforceable liabilities). 
174 See id. (noting the difficulty in establishing certainty of tax liability). 
175 Id. at 257. 
176 See id.
177 See id. at 266 (Skelton, J., dissenting). 
178 See I.R.C. § 3102(b) (“Every employer required so to deduct the tax 
shall be liable for the payment of such tax ....”). 
179 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 3111(a) (employer portion of FICA taxes for old age, 
survivor, and disability insurance (i.e., Social Security taxes)). 
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the employer might ask whether it also had a fixed liability in 
Year 1 for the associated payroll taxes. In these situations, courts 
and eventually the Service have applied the all events test by 
ignoring the fact that the payroll taxes would only become legally 
enforceable in Year 2.180 Instead, they have applied the all 
events test by looking for certainty at the end of Year 1.181
 The courts have found that certainty for payroll taxes de-
pends on any wage ceiling (i.e., maximum salary base) used in 
computing the taxes.182 The courts reasoned that, if an employ-
ee’s wages were to exceed the ceiling when payment occurs in 
Year 2, the employer would have no payroll tax obligation and 
therefore could not have had a fixed liability for the tax at the 
end of Year 1.183 The courts accordingly envisioned that factors, 
such as conceivable pay raises and unscheduled time off, could 
affect the employer’s future obligation for payroll taxes on earned, 
but unpaid, compensation.184 Consequently, for earned bonuses 
and vacation pay, courts found employers too uncertain in Year 1 
about whether wages would exceed the ceilings by the time they 
disburse delayed bonuses or vacation pay in Year 2; therefore, the 
courts held that such uncertainty prevented the associated pay-
roll tax liabilities from being fixed in Year 1.185 In contrast, the 
courts attributed a payroll tax obligation to an “automatic con-
sequence” of having wages earned in the last days of Year 1 and 
paid on the first scheduled payday of Year 2 (year-end wages).186
They found that the virtual certainty of a payroll tax obligation 
on year-end wages creates a fixed, but legally unenforceable, li-
ability for purposes of the all events test.187
180 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak, 534 F.2d at 257; Rev. Rul. 96-51, 1996-2 C.B. 
36, 36–37. 
181 See Eastman Kodak, 534 F.2d at 257; Rev. Rul. 96-51, 1996-2 C.B. 36, 
36–37. 
182 See Eastman Kodak, 534 F.2d at 259 (noting the complicated nature of 
wage ceilings as a factor of the all events test). 
183 See id.
184 See id. at 260. 
185 See id.; S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 497, 634–35 (1980). 
186 Eastman Kodak, 534 F.2d at 259–60. 
187 See id. at 260; Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Comm’r, 82 T.C. 143, 148 (1984), 
acq., 1996-2 C.B. 1.; Rev. Rul. 96-51, 1996-2 C.B. 36, 36–37. 
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The willingness to accept virtual certainty, instead of de-
manding inevitability, presents an administrative challenge.188
Avoiding a wage ceiling is more probable for the beginning-of-year 
payments of year-end wages than avoiding the ceiling for the de-
ferred payments of some bonuses and vacation pay.189 However, 
the liability for year-end wages at the end of Year 1 only creates 
a logical expectation rather than an absolute obligation to pay 
payroll taxes.190 Nevertheless, courts and eventually the Service 
found the virtual certainty of the obligation sufficient to satisfy 
the all events test for payroll taxes on year-end wages.191 Yet it 
remains unclear what “special kind of knowledge” a taxpayer 
must possess to determine the “absolute necessity” of satisfying 
a legally unenforceable obligation for this purpose.192
 The vague notion of virtual certainty continues to influence 
the application of the all events test for payroll taxes.193 For ex-
ample, the Service recently suggested a broader scope of virtual 
certainty by alluding to employers with fixed obligations for pay-
roll taxes attributable to earned bonuses, vacation pay, and forms 
of compensation other than year-end wages.194 The Service has 
188 See Eastman Kodak, 534 F.2d at 260–61 (specifying certainty as the de-
terminative factor to the all events test). 
189 See id. at 259. 
190 See id. at 266–68 (Skelton, J., dissenting) (rejecting a deduction for 
payroll taxes that remain contingent before the prerequisite event of paying 
wages occurs). 
191 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory, 1994 WL 1725365 (Apr. 15, 1994) (ac-
knowledging the concession due to litigation hazards). 
192 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,155 (Nov. 7, 1979), clarified by Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 38,536 (Oct. 15, 1980); cf. S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 
497, 636 (1980) (“Regardless of the close relationship between the two items, 
we have concluded that the contingencies and uncertainties associated with 
petitioner’s estimated liability for the payroll taxes at issue are too great to 
permit their deduction.”). 
193 See Rev. Rul. 2007-12, 2007-1 C.B. 685, 686 (noting the troubles of ap-
plying the all events test based on past regulation); Rich Godshalk, Accelerat-
ing FICA and FUTA Tax Deductions for Vacation and Bonus Pay, 39 TAX 
ADVISER 136, 136 (Mar. 2008) (“Unfortunately [§ 404] does not address the 
issue of when the all-events test is satisfied with respect to payroll taxes on 
deferred compensation.”). 
194 See Rev. Rul. 2007-12, 2007-1 C.B. 685, 686.  
If the all events test ... [is] otherwise met, an accrual basis 
taxpayer may treat its payroll tax liability as incurred in Year 1, 
regardless of whether the compensation to which the liability 
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also recognized that, as a result of factors such as the substantial 
increases in wage ceilings since the courts initially considered 
payroll tax liabilities,195 employers might now have greater cer-
tainty about their upcoming payroll tax obligations.196 For in-
stance, an employer of a low-wage employee could seem virtually 
certain at the end of Year 1 of its payroll tax liability for earned 
compensation regardless of whether the employee might receive 
a modest raise in Year 2 or when the employee might use vested 
vacation time in Year 2.197 Consequently, for purposes of the re-
curring item exception, the Service introduced a safe-harbor 
method to reduce administrative burdens and controversy by deem-
ing the all events test for a payroll tax liability satisfied in the 
same year that an employer satisfies the all events test for the 
related compensation liability.198
 Outside the context of payroll taxes, it remains unclear how 
this notion of virtual certainty for legally unenforceable obligations 
works.199 Many buyers and sellers, especially those in long-term 
relates is deferred compensation [(i.e., paid more than 2 ½ months 
after the end of Year 1)] that is deductible under § 404 in Year 2. 
Id. A commentator noted:
Because Rev. Rul. 2007-12 provides no analysis of the satis-
faction of the all-events test for the deduction of the payroll 
taxes on vacation and bonus pay expense, but merely stipu-
lates that “if” the all-events test is satisfied, it is not clear how 
the IRS will apply the “payment is certain” criteria in Eastman 
Kodak to current payroll tax wage ceilings. Rev. Rul. 2007-12 
revoked Rev. Rul. 69-587, which held that payroll taxes on 
vacation and bonus pay expenses are not deductible until the 
tax year the underlying compensation is paid. In light of this, 
the IRS will presumably allow the deduction of the payroll taxes 
on vacation and bonus pay expense under certain circumstances 
for the tax year in which the underlying compensation is earned. 
Godshalk, supra note 193, at 138. 
195 Compare Eastman Kodak Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 252, 259 (Ct. 
Cl. 1976) ($4,800 annual FICA wage ceiling in 1965) with Press Release, Soc. 
Sec. Admin., Social Security Announces 1.6 Percent Benefit Increase for 2020
(Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/releases/2019/#10-2019-1 
[https://perma.cc/RG9S-J59W] ($137,700 annual FICA wage ceiling in 2020). 
196 See Rev. Proc. 2008-25, 2008-1 C.B. 686 § 2.09. 
197 See id. § 4.02. 
198 See id. § 4.01. 
199 See Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 89, at 568–69 (illustrating 
the nature of long-term contracts). 
360 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:329 
relationships, presumably operate with the “special kind of knowl-
edge” that provides certainty about the “absolute necessity” of re-
specting rights and liabilities regardless of legal enforceability.200
The buyers and sellers develop knowledge from their prior experi-
ences together, industry practices and norms, certifications of opera-
tions from third parties, due diligence conducted before entering 
into supply agreements, etc.201 The ongoing relationships that pro-
vide this special kind of knowledge also influence the contracts that 
they execute and the manner in which they conduct business.202
Taxpayers thus need clarification about how certainty from actual 
business dealings affects accruals under the all events tests.203
 Buyers and sellers in long-term relationships might know 
their rights and liabilities relative to performance obligations 
even if their contracts cannot express expectations in readily en-
forceable terms. Sometimes contracts in these relationships de-
fine performance in general terms, such as “best efforts,” rather 
than stating specific performance obligations because parties are 
unsure about future operating conditions and appropriate re-
sponses to those conditions.204 Vagueness about certain aspects 
of a contractual arrangement can provide needed flexibility for 
dealing with future events.205 Nevertheless, based on industry 
200 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38, 155 (Nov. 7, 1979). 
201 See Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 89, at 566–67. 
202 See Patience A. Crowder, Impact Transaction: Lawyering for the Public 
Good Through Collective Impact Agreements, 49 IND. L. REV. 621, 661 (2016) 
(“[R]elational contracts have come to be identified by a list of characteristics 
that include: indefiniteness about duration; informality of language; incom-
pleteness; imprecise performance standards; expectations of the role for social 
norms and social control; reference to industry standards; and gaps in risk 
allocation.” (footnotes omitted)). 
203 Cf. Constructive Conditions, supra note 158, at 463 (noting the over-
simplistic nature of Revenue Ruling 2007-3 on how to handle certainty).  
204 See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts,
67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1092–93 (1981); Scott Baker & Albert Choi, Contract’s Role in 
Relational Contract, 101 VA. L. REV. 559, 579–80 (2015); Gilson et al., supra note 
24, at 1391 (“Uncertainty about the future makes specifying most future states—
let alone the appropriate action that is to be taken if they occur—prohibitively 
costly or impossible.”); WOLFE, supra note 69, § 7-183 (“The parties have 
failed to reach the illusory goal of the ‘perfectly contingent contract’ ....”). 
205 See Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Pre-
liminary Study, 28 AM. SOCIO. REV. 55, 64 (1963) (“Businessmen may welcome a 
measure of vagueness in the obligations they assume so that they may nego-
tiate matters [during performance] in light of the actual circumstances.”). 
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norms and common experiences, a buyer and seller presumably “can 
develop a shared and unambiguous understanding of what 
counts as contract performance, even if they cannot convert their 
definition of performance into a verifiable contract term enforce-
able by a court.”206 Thereafter, the parties themselves might need 
to determine whether performance has occurred under these im-
precise requirements207 because industry insiders, rather than 
courts or other outsiders, can most easily discern if expectations 
were met.208 Even if certain industries or organizations—
particularly those operating in environments with rapid innova-
tion—might face considerable challenges in finding mutually 
agreed upon expectations upfront, the contracting parties in those 
contexts still likely know whether performance has occurred.209
 Regulatory provisions in contracts might also rely on the 
shared understandings of contracting parties to make sense of 
incomplete contract terms about performance. Because regulatory 
provisions usually address process-related concerns, they can 
lack the detail expected, for instance, in the physical specifications 
for manufactured goods.210 For example, buyers and sellers might 
agree to follow sustainability principles, treat animals humanely, 
or procure materials with ethical practices. The fulfillment of 
these commitments might be difficult to assess objectively; how-
ever, each party might be virtually certain about the expected 
performance and whether it occurred as promised. It seems nec-
essary to account for such virtual certainty if performance will 
continue to serve as an event that often fixes rights and liabili-
ties for purposes of the all events tests. 
 Even if a contract defines performance obligations and 
consequences of breach in detail, the stated terms might not compel 
conforming performance or establish the real payment obliga-
tions.211 Studies have observed that, after parties execute con-
tracts, they frequently operate without regard to contractual 
206 Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 23, at 984; see Macaulay, supra note 
205, at 62 (noting how “usually there is little room for honest misunderstand-
ing or good faith differences of opinion about the nature and quality of a sell-
er’s performance”).  
207 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 204, at 1093–94. 
208 Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 23, at 984. 
209 See id. at 986. 
210 See id.
211 See Macaulay, supra note 205, at 61. 
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terms.212 As a result, parties likely understand that the real ob-
ligations differ from the stated rights and liabilities, which cre-
ates questions about whether the all events tests would account 
for the certain or the enforceable obligations.213 For example, a 
buyer and long-term supplier might both realize that the buyer 
lacks a credible threat to invoke its contractual right to damages 
for a failure to comply with a regulatory provision because a dam-
ages claim would end their relationship.214 Even with a pattern 
of nonconforming performance, the buyer might become reluctant 
to terminate their relationship due to high costs of switching 
suppliers and risks of developing a reputation among other sup-
pliers as an undesirable trading partner.215 The buyer’s practical 
situation could, therefore cause it to bear losses from the suppli-
er’s noncompliance despite the buyer’s contractual entitlement 
to compensation.216 The contract might attempt to mitigate this 
problem by providing the buyer with an explicit right to with-
hold payment or impose fines for noncompliance.217 However, 
the buyer might still decide to invoke this self-regulated remedy 
only after repeated nonconforming performances in order to avoid 
developing a heavy-handed reputation among suppliers.218 In 
these situations, it is unclear if a buyer and seller should account 
for the enforceable obligations stated in a contract or the virtually 
certain fact of liability drawn from their practical experiences.219
 Regulatory provisions can also increase interactions between 
buyers and sellers in ways that potentially enhance certainty about 
rights and liabilities.220 For example, some original equipment 
manufacturers use process-related provisions in contracts to in-
crease the likelihood of receiving conforming performance.221
212 Id.; Merchant Law, supra note 154, at 1787 (describing a documented 
observation “that the contours of transactors’ contracting relationship may not 
be the same as the scope of the rights and duties memorialized in their written, 
legally enforceable contract”). 
213 See Merchant Law, supra note 154, at 1787–88. 
214 See Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 89, at 569–70. 
215 See id. at 570–71. 
216 See id. at 570–72. 
217 See id. at 571. 
218 See id. at 570–71. 
219 See id. 
220 See id. at 572–76. 
221 See id.
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These provisions might require the supplier to adhere to certain 
production or quality standards, allow the manufacturer to oversee 
the supplier’s operations, or grant the manufacturer with cer-
tain decision-making authority over the supplier’s operations.222
These process-related provisions are necessary in dealing with 
suppliers because manufacturers, 
many of whom operate on a just-in-time inventory basis, do 
not simply contract, wait for delivery, accept or reject, and 
then sue if cure is not forthcoming. Rather, they interact with 
their suppliers throughout the production, delivery, and quality 
assessment process to try and catch problems sooner rather 
than later and work together to solve problems rather than 
threatening one another with lawsuits.223
 The process-related provisions provide a structure that pro-
motes conforming performance as the parties navigate through a 
seemingly informal and cooperative relationship to achieve these 
objectives rather than rely on the enforcement of formal contractual 
obligations.224 The interactions and cooperation in these relation-
ships undoubtedly influence their certainty about the receipt of 
expected performances and the absoluteness of entitlements and re-
sponsibilities regardless of the formal terms of their agreements.225
 Existing authorities and guidance have not explained the 
extent to which virtual certainty establishes fixed rights and li-
abilities for purposes of the all events tests. Contracting parties 
undoubtedly understand their dealings in ways that contractual 
language does not always convey.226 As process-related provisions 
increase interactions between parties and their reliance on shared 
understandings of performance,227 the all events tests will need 
to clarify how the parties’ virtual certainty about their rights 
and liabilities affect tax accruals. 
222 See id.
223 Id. at 576. 
224 See id.
225 See id. at 578, 588–89. 
226 See Merchant Law, supra note 154, at 1788 (“If transactors either act or 
intend to act in ways that differ from their understanding of the express 
terms of their written contract, their actions are no longer ... an accurate guide to 
their view of the meaning of their written agreements.”); see also Hwang & 
Jennejohn, supra note 55, at 287 (noting how standards are easy to draft into 
a contract but difficult to enforce due to difficulties in interpretation). 
227 See Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 89, at 572–76. 
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B. Known vs. Knowable Information About Regulatory
Compliance
 The all events tests, which trace their origin to United
States v. Anderson,228 identify a fixed and determinable right or 
liability from events that occur by year-end regardless of whether 
a taxpayer actually knows that the events occurred.229 The Court 
in Anderson had required a corporation to compute its taxable 
income from all expenses accrued on its books because the Code, 
at that time, had permitted a taxpayer to use an accrual method 
only if the taxpayer prepared its tax return in the same manner 
as it kept its books.230 The presence of book accruals in Anderson
implied that the corporation knew about the underlying events; 
however, the strict book-conformity requirement made actual 
knowledge irrelevant to the Court’s holding.231 But later, as the 
conformity requirement relaxed,232 questions about knowledge 
emerged as taxpayers, the Service, and courts tried to follow 
Anderson’s dictum of accruing items when “all the events ... occur” 
that satisfy both prongs of the all events tests.233
228 269 U.S. 422, 441 (1926); see I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2010-06-031 (Sept. 30, 
2009) (describing Anderson as the origin for the all events tests now contained in 
the regulations); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-31-003 (Apr. 13, 1978) (describing the 
regulations as “merely a regulatory paraphrasing of a Supreme Court mandate”). 
229 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-29-007 (Apr. 13, 1992). 
230 See Anderson, 269 U.S. at 440–42; cf. Niles Bement Pond Co. v. United 
States, 281 U.S. 357, 360 (1930).  
Under the 1916 Act where the taxpayer’s books are kept and 
his returns made on the accrual basis, taxes charged on the books 
as they accrue must be deducted when accrued, if true income 
is thus reflected .... Even if not so charged, it was competent 
for the Commissioner ... to correct the taxpayer’s return by 
deducting the payments in the year in which they accrued so 
as to reflect true income by conforming to the dominating or 
controlling character of the taxpayer’s system of accounts. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
231 See Anderson, 269 U.S. at 439, 441. 
232 See STEPHEN F. GERTZMAN, FEDERAL TAX ACCOUNTING ¶ 4.02[3] (2d ed. 
1993) (describing how book and tax accounting diverged). 
233 Anderson, 269 U.S. at 441. The Court described a proper accrual for a 
munitions tax expense where, “in advance of the assessment of [the] tax, all 
the events may occur which fix the amount of the tax and determine the lia-
bility of the taxpayer to pay it.” Id.
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 Those questions asked what effect a taxpayer’s knowledge 
about the occurrence of relevant events might have in determin-
ing the appropriateness of an accrual.234 Case law responded with 
a general expectation that taxpayers should base accruals on 
knowable information.235 So taxpayers must accrue items aris-
ing from knowable, rather than known, events for tax purposes 
even though the taxpayers’ books would not reflect the yet un-
known events.236 A knowable standard has practical appeal be-
cause it prevents, for example, a taxpayer from relying on a lack 
of actual knowledge—“I didn’t know and didn’t care to ask”—as 
an excuse for failing to report income.237 Even so, questions per-
sist about whether the knowable standard applies to one or both 
prongs of the all events tests.238
 The knowable standard plainly applies to the amount 
prongs.239 In that context, the standard accepts that the ability to 
determine an amount with reasonable accuracy depends on know-
able facts.240 The concept of reasonable accuracy contemplates 
234 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-31-003 (Apr. 13, 1978). 
235 See id. (describing judicial developments related to knowable information). 
236 See Uncasville Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 55 F.2d 893, 895 (2d Cir. 1932). 
237 See Camilla Cotton Oil Co. v. Comm’r, 31 T.C. 560, 568 (1958), acq.,
1959-2 C.B. 3. 
238 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 80-23-008 (Mar. 12, 1980). 
239 See id.
240 See id. (“A number of authorities base ascertainability on the facts 
which the taxpayer knew or could reasonably be expected to know ....”). The 
Service clearly associated knowable facts with the amount prong while ad-
dressing accruals for entitlements arising under a Department of Energy (“DOE”) 
program during an oil crisis. See id. The program sought to allocate equitably 
the benefits of certain price-controlled oil by generally requiring refiners, which 
purchased a greater portion of price-controlled oil than the national average, 
to buy entitlements for processing such oil from other refiners, which purchased a 
lesser portion of price-controlled oil. See id. The DOE collected nationwide oil 
purchase information each month and, approximately two months after the 
month of the oil purchases, published a notice that named the refiners and 
specified the dollar amounts of their respective obligations to buy or sell enti-
tlements. See id. The Service found that the refiners had fixed rights and lia-
bilities for the entitlements in the month of the oil purchases—even though a 
particular refiner could not have known if it had a right or liability until the 
publication of the notice—because the oil purchases, which gave rise to the 
entitlements, occurred during those months. See id. But, the Service found 
that the amounts were not determinable with reasonable accuracy until the 
publication of the notice. See id. With respect to the amount prong, the Ser-
vice noted that the calculation of the amount depended on information that was 
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measuring amounts from facts or with computational methods 
within a taxpayer’s reach even if a different amount would have 
been determined with the advantage of perfect knowledge.241 Con-
sequently, where a taxpayer can ascertain an amount from availa-
ble facts, the taxpayer should do so.242 In contrast, where a taxpayer 
could not have known the amount of an otherwise acknowledged 
right or liability, the knowable standard would reject guesses 
about its amount and would excuse its nonaccrual.243 The tax-
payer would thereafter account for refinements to the amount of 
the fixed right or liability by reporting or adjusting its income in 
future periods as better information becomes available.244
 Similarly, a taxpayer’s actual knowledge of relevant events 
cannot effect whether a fixed right or liability exists.245 The fixed 
prongs of the all events tests focus on the occurrence of events 
that “fix the right” to income or “establish the fact” of liability.246
A taxpayer’s rights and liabilities exist independently of the tax-
payer’s actual knowledge about them.247 Accordingly, the fixed 
knowable only after the DOE published its notice, including the national average 
for purchases of price-controlled oil. See id.; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 
38, 287 (Feb. 21, 1980). 
241 See Frost Lumber Indus. v. Comm’r, 128 F.2d 693, 696 (5th Cir. 1942) 
(concluding that an unalterable method of computing a purchase price at $6.25 
per acre rendered the gain from the sale of land determinable with reasona-
ble accuracy despite potential uncertainty about the number of acres sold); 
Comm’r v. Old Dominion S.S. Co., 47 F.2d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 1931) (finding the 
amount of a conceded liability to pay “just compensation” determinable from 
past facts and established principles). 
242 See Keller-Dorian Corp. v. Comm’r, 153 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1946) 
(holding that the correct amount of custom duties for goods were ascertainable in 
the year when the goods were imported, despite an erroneous initial computa-
tion and acceptance of the duties that required eventual reappraisals, because 
the basis for the computation did not change). 
243 See, e.g., United Dairy Farmers, Inc. v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 2d 
937, 948 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (finding that a taxpayer could not determine its 
liability with reasonable accuracy until a service provider supplied an item-
ized invoice for services rendered in a prior year), aff’d on other issues, 267 
F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2001).  
244 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.451-1(a), 1.461-1(a)(2)(ii). 
245 See id. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(A). 
246 Id.
247 See Harrisburg Steel Corp. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 626, 630 
(M.D. Pa. 1956) (“I do not feel that knowledge is a necessary ingredient in the 
ascertainment of the time of income accrual for tax purposes.”). 
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prongs resemble the amount prongs insofar as neither requires 
actual knowledge.248
 For example, the Service has ruled that a taxpayer would 
improperly accrue income for mistakenly billed service charges if 
the taxpayer lacked an actual right to receive them.249 The rul-
ing involved a taxpayer that had unknowingly billed its custom-
er for services provided to a third party as a result of the third 
party’s unsanctioned use of the customer’s authorization code 
(i.e., a form of identity theft).250 After the customer notified the 
taxpayer about the potential code abuse, the taxpayer investi-
gated the situation and found that the customer had no liability 
for the charges.251 Even though the taxpayer discovered the mis-
taken charges after it had already reported them as income on a 
return prepared from information available at year-end, the 
Service found the original income accrual improper.252 The Ser-
vice concluded that the taxpayer never satisfied the all events 
test because “events ... determine whether a taxpayer has a fixed 
right ... irrespective of when the taxpayer has actual knowledge 
of the events fixing the right.”253 Consequently, the Service ac-
cepted that unknown events, which at best are knowable only 
through investigation, control whether a fixed right or liability 
exists for purposes of the all events tests.254
 Although disregarding actual knowledge seems unremarka-
ble in evaluating the need for accruals, the extent to which a 
knowable standard and its implicit limitation apply to the fixed 
prongs is unclear.255 By expecting taxpayers to account for 
knowable information, the knowable standard implicitly recog-
nizes that some unknown information might prove incapable of 
being known by year-end.256 To the extent unknowable infor-
mation rules out an accrual,257 it matters whether the knowable 
248 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 80-23-008 (1980); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-
1(c)(1)(ii)(A). 






255 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 80-23-008; Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(A). 
256 See id.
257 See GERTZMAN, supra note 232, ¶ 4.03[1][a][ii]. 
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standard applies to determining the amount of a right or liabil-
ity and in identifying the existence of that right or liability.258
 The frequent application of a knowable standard to the 
amount prongs means that limits on knowability can clearly af-
fect the amount of an accrual.259 Consistent with the annual ac-
counting concept, the knowable standard reflects a long-standing 
notion that taxable income should account for facts that a tax-
payer knew or could reasonably have known at year end.260 Rather 
than expecting perfectly informed taxpayers, courts have invoked 
practical approaches for determining an amount with reasonable 
accuracy based on data within a taxpayer’s possession.261 Thus 
taxpayers generally must accrue amounts determinable from the 
information they actually possess or could obtain with reasona-
ble efforts.262 In contrast, the standard neither requires nor 
permits accruals for fixed rights and liabilities of amounts de-
terminable only through unreasonable efforts (i.e., unknowable 
amounts).263 For example, the Tax Court found that a contract-
ing party’s concealment of relevant information from a taxpayer 
prevented the amount of income from being knowable at year-
end and precluded its accrual.264
258 See id.  
259 See Camilla Cotton Oil Co. v. Comm’r, 31 T.C. 560, 568 (1958), acq.,
1959-2 C.B. 3. 
260 See Balt. Transfer Co. v. Comm’r, 8 T.C. 1, 7 (1947), acq., 1947-2 C.B. 1. 
261 See, e.g., Cont’l Tie & Lumber Co. v. United States, 286 U.S. 290, 296 (1932) 
(addressing “whether the taxpayer had in its own books and accounts data to 
which it could apply the calculations required by the statute and ascertain the 
quantum of the award within reasonable limits” (emphasis in original)). 
262 See Resale Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Comm’r, 965 F.2d 818, 824 (10th Cir. 
1992) (finding an amount of participation interest income determinable with 
reasonable accuracy from amortization schedules reflecting assumed payments 
from borrowers despite the fact that the finance company, which owned the 
commercial paper, had the actual payment information); Schneider v. Comm’r, 
65 T.C. 18, 23–24 (1975) (expecting the awareness of a liability to prompt ef-
forts to secure an estimate about its amount from the debtor, which possessed 
the data needed for the calculation), acq., 1976-2 C.B. 1. But see United Dairy 
Farmers, Inc. v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 2d 937, 948 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (de-
ferring the accrual of a liability until a service provider supplied an invoice show-
ing the amount due for services, which the taxpayer knew were rendered to 
the taxpayer in a prior year), aff’d on other issues, 267 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2001). 
263 See Camilla Cotton Oil Co. v. Comm’r, 31 T.C. 560, 568 (1958), acq.,
1959-2 C.B. 3. 
264 Id.
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 Unfortunately, the potential application of a knowable 
standard to the fixed prongs remains unclear.265 Despite occa-
sional references to accounting for rights and liabilities reasonably 
certain in fact,266 the tests emphasize unconditional rights and 
obligations that exist because particular events occurred.267 It 
remains unclear whether this emphasis on the existence or non-
existence of rights and liabilities268 might even entertain the idea 
of basing accruals on what is reasonably knowable to a taxpayer. 
 For example, the all events tests do not explicitly address 
how certain a taxpayer must be about the consequences of known 
events.269 One might hold taxpayers to a knowable standard that 
makes them responsible for figuring out the effects of known 
events.270 Thus, even if one might expect lengthy court proceedings 
would be needed to determine that a taxpayer became legally liable 
as a result of the earlier occurrence of known events,271 the liability 
If accrual is not to be required where a taxpayer’s books and 
accounts, through no fault of the taxpayer, fail to supply the 
data needed to make reasonable calculations, a fortiori, accrual 
is not to be required when the taxpayer has no knowledge of 
the underlying obligation or debt due him. 
Id. The Tax Court drew a comparison to the “usual impossibility of account-
ing for [an embezzlement] loss in the year of concealment” in employing a 
practical solution of not requiring an accrual for concealed income. Id.
265 See infra notes 266–68 and accompanying text.  
266 See, e.g., C.A. Durr Packing Co. v. Shaughnessy, 81 F. Supp. 33, 35 
(N.D.N.Y. 1948). 
267 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-46-082 (July 21, 1978) (“The fact of the 
liability is not permitted to be determined using the same reasonable accuracy 
standard that is permitted in determining the amount of the expense.”). 
268 See Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Comm’r, 90 T.C. 26, 34 (1988) (“The all-
events test is based on the existence or nonexistence of legal rights or obliga-
tions at the close of a particular accounting period, not on the probability—or 
even absolute certainty—that such right or obligation will arise at some point 
in the future.” (citing United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 239, 
243–44 (1987) and Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193, 201 (1934))). 
269 See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 239, 243 (1987).  
270 Cf. Uncasville Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 55 F.2d 893, 895 (2d Cir. 1932) 
(finding that a computation may be unknown but that does not mean that it 
is unknowable).
271 A bona fide dispute represents a condition precedent to a fixed right or 
liability and would prevent its accrual. See Lucas v. Am. Code Co., 280 U.S. 
445, 451–52 (1930). A taxpayer nevertheless might not definitely know about 
a contractual liability even if the contracting parties never dispute it.  
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arguably was equally determinable and knowable to the taxpayer 
as soon as the relevant events occurred.272 The taxpayer could 
have known the consequences by “correctly” applying the law.273
Conversely, one might admit that certainty about a liability—
the “fact of the liability” referenced in the regulations274—can
remain elusive and accept instead that reasonably knowable 
consequences should determine the satisfaction of the all events 
tests.275 Both perspectives have some merit, but no guidance clari-
fies whether the fixed prongs incorporate a knowable standard 
that might account for how well a taxpayer appreciates the con-
sequences of known events. 
 More importantly for purposes of this Article, existing 
guidance does not adequately address how the potential to know 
about the occurrence of particular events might affect the satis-
faction of the fixed prongs.276 A taxpayer might understand the 
consequences of events but could remain uncertain about whether 
272 Cf. Uncasville, 55 F.2d at 895. 
All the facts upon which the calculation [of a state tax, which 
was deductible on a federal return,] depended had been fixed 
before the expiration of the year 1918. Differences could arise, 
and did, as to the amount of the company’s income for that 
year, but they were due to the proper appraisal of its property, 
and possible disputes as to the meaning of the law. The com-
putation was uncertain, but its basis was unchangeable; it 
was unknown, not unknowable on December 31, 1918. 
Id.; Keller-Dorian Corp. v. Comm’r, 153 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1946) (“[A] 
legal error [in applying an unchanged statute to facts] cannot be used by a 
taxpayer as a basis for saying that he could not have known the correct 
amount of the [expenses] in the earlier years when they accrued.”). 
273 Cf. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-31-003 (Apr. 13, 1978) (“These facts might not 
be know[n], i.e., a taxpayer improperly computed its profits, but such facts were 
knowable, i.e., it was possible for the taxpayer to compute its profits correctly.”). 
274 Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2)(i)(2019). 
275 See Balt. Transfer Co. v. Comm’r, 8 T.C. 1, 9 (1947) (“Changes in law 
and in official interpretation of law, particularly if not reasonably expectable, 
must ... be regarded as independent operative facts for accounting purposes.”), 
acq., 1947-2 C.B. 1; Comment, Contested Tax Liabilities and the Annual Ac-
counting Concept—The Japanese Trading Co. Application, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
961, 970 n.56 (1967) (criticizing the knowable approach of Uncasville as “un-
realistic in assuming that the taxpayer can predict the results of litigation of 
questions of either fact or law”). 
276 See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 239, 243 (1987) 
(laying out the all-events test but not addressing how the potential to know 
about the occurrence of particular events might affect the test). 
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the events occurred or could assume incorrectly the events occurred. 
In those situations, should taxpayers determine their rights and 
liabilities from what they think occurred, what they could have 
discovered occurred, or what actually occurred regardless of the 
potential for discovery? 
 The few rulings in this area show, at times, a surprising 
tolerance for oblivious taxpayers and at other times, undue con-
fidence in finding omniscient taxpayers.277 In some instances, rights 
or liabilities were considered fixed based on taxpayers’ percep-
tions of events regardless of the actual occurrence of events.278
For example, the Service held that a manufacturer, which mis-
takenly shipped the wrong mix of products to a customer, had a 
fixed right to income in the year of shipment.279 The Service ap-
parently believed that the mistaken shipment satisfied its per-
formance obligation and fixed the manufacturer’s right to income.280
The ability to look at the products and learn about the mistake, 
which the customer actually discovered in the following year, played 
no apparent role in determining whether the events occurred to 
fix the manufacturer’s right to income.281
 But with respect to other taxpayers, the fixed nature of 
rights or liabilities has seemed to turn on the occurrence of in-
conspicuous or even unknowable events.282 Thus, in the ruling 
277 See infra notes 278–81 and accompanying text.  
278 See, e.g., Frost Lumber Indus., Inc. v. Comm’r, 128 F.2d 693, 696 (5th 
Cir. 1942) (finding a closed sale transaction and fixed right to income, despite 
the formal acceptance of title in a later year, from the conduct of the parties 
and noting a title attorney being “practically certain” of good title and the 
seller having “a reasonable expectancy of payment”). 
279 See Rev. Rul. 2003-10, 2003-1 C.B. 288, 289. 
280 See id. The Service required the manufacturer to recognize income, 
computed from the incorrect product mix, in the year of shipment. Id.
281 See id.; accord Celluloid Co. v. Comm’r, 9 B.T.A. 989, 1005–06 (1927) 
(rejecting a proposed adjustment to accrued income to account for the deliv-
ery of defective products, which customers returned after year end, because 
the taxpayer only had an anticipatory “liability” for the returned items, but 
not considering whether the taxpayer had a right to receive income from de-
livering items with known defects), acq., 1928-1 C.B. 6. 
282 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 80-23-008 (Mar. 12, 1980). As discussed above, 
see I.R.S., supra note 238, the Service found that rights or liabilities to buy or 
sell entitlements existed under a DOE program in the month during which 
refiners purchased oil because nothing occurring thereafter could affect the 
number or price of the entitlements. See id. But the Service concluded that 
information about the rights and liabilities, including whether a particular 
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described above, the Service found a taxpayer had no right to 
income for mistaken service charges arising from a third party’s 
unauthorized use of an access code.283 The Service based its con-
clusion on the fact that the necessary event—actual usage by 
the customer—never occurred.284 Instead of allowing the tax-
payer to report billed income in a manner consistent with its 
understanding of fulfilled performances, the Service expected 
the taxpayer to discern the event’s nonoccurrence even though it 
had no reason to suspect the unauthorized access prior to the 
customer’s discovery of the mistaken charges.285
 Yet, on occasion, the Service has departed from these ex-
treme positions and indicated a willingness to determine fixed 
rights and liabilities from the occurrence of reasonably knowable 
events.286 For example, in recent Chief Counsel Advice, the Ser-
vice focused on unknowable information to conclude that a par-
ticipant in a shared savings program should not report income in 
the year it rendered medical services to Medicare beneficiaries.287
The program generally allows an Accountable Care Organization 
(ACO) to receive a portion of earned cost savings if it meets quality 
performance standards and generates sufficient savings while 
providing medical services.288 The Service pointed to program-
matic factors, including retroactive assignments of Medicare 
beneficiaries and retrospective determinations of cost benchmarks, 
which prevent an ACO from having access to knowable facts at 
year end.289 Without knowable facts, the Service justifiably con-
cluded that the ACO could not determine the amount of income 
with reasonable accuracy.290 But the lack of knowable facts clearly 
refiner was obligated to buy or to sell, was not knowable until two months 
later when the DOE published the information. See id. The Service held that 
the lack of available information prevented the amount, rather than the ex-
istence, of a right or liability from being knowable. See id. Accordingly, the 
Service accepted that rights and liabilities could become fixed before they be-
come knowable. See id. 
283 See supra text accompanying notes 249–53. 
284 Id.
285 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-29-007 (Apr. 13, 1992).  
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influenced the Service’s approach to the fixed right prong of the 
all events test too.291 The Service found that the programmatic 
factors left the ACO “unable to determine if it will have achieved 
the necessary savings to participate” in the program’s shared 
savings and accordingly deprived the ACO of a fixed right to in-
come.292 Thus, rather than emphasize the performance of the 
services, which established the quality and costs measured by 
the program, the Service considered only facts knowable at year 
end to determine whether the events had occurred to fix the 
taxpayer’s right.293
 The potential thus exists to determine the existence of 
fixed rights and liabilities under a knowable standard.294 That 
approach might reasonably address the practical difficulty of de-
termining the occurrence of some events with certainty.295 The 
all events tests would then preclude accruals based on unknowable 
events, which might require unreasonable efforts to discover. 
Unfortunately, existing authorities and guidance have inconsist-
ently approached knowable events and have rarely character-
ized fixed rights and liabilities as being knowable, which makes 
the applicability of a knowable standard uncertain.296
 To the extent the fixed prongs of the all events tests rely on 
a knowable standard, self-regulation efforts might significantly 
291 See id.
292 Id. (highlighting that beneficiary information was “knowable only af-
ter” their assignment and that “ACO practitioners may not have knowledge” 
of all costs). The Service stated that “[t]he amount is not fixed,” id., which 
raises a question about whether the fixed prong might apply to a right to in-
come generally or to a right to a specific amount of income. Compare Rev. 
Rul. 2003-10, 2003-1 C.B. 288, 289 (concluding that a taxpayer could not ac-
crue an improper amount due to a clerical mistake because the taxpayer 
“[did] not have a fixed right to that amount”), with Comm’r v. Terre Haute 
Elec. Co., 67 F.2d 697, 699 (7th Cir. 1933) (finding a lessor’s fixed right to in-
come from the terms of a lease that obligated the lessee to pay income taxes 
imposed on the lessor even though “[t]he amount of the taxes may be clouded 
in doubt” by litigation over the amount of the imposed taxes). 
293 See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. 2016-07-026 (Feb. 12, 2016). 
294 See id. 
295 Cf. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-46-082 (July 21, 1978) (finding no fixed 
liability where “the taxpayer is not in a position to determine as a fact” its 
liability to pay costs attributable to covered medical treatment for employees 
without the filing and examination of appropriate documentation). 
296 See supra notes 265–68 and accompanying text.  
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affect many accruals because those efforts will change the knowa-
ble information of taxpayers.297 Regulatory provisions often im-
pose process-related obligations, which create credence qualities 
in goods and services.298 These credence qualities arise from the 
use of preferred processes, such as following fair labor practices in 
the manufacturing of goods; however, the qualities often “do not 
inhere in the goods and cannot be observed in the end product.”299
For example, employees benefiting from a fair wage policy could 
manufacture goods that are identical to the goods manufactured 
by employees without such benefit.300 If a regulatory provision 
in a supply agreement requires compliance with the fair wage 
policy, then the buyer might find compliance impossible or ex-
ceedingly difficult to assess with respect to delivered goods.301
Where compliance with the policy represents a condition on the 
obligation to pay or a performance obligation for purposes of the 
all events tests,302 the buyer would normally lack a supportable 
basis for concluding that the unobservable compliance either did 
or did not occur.303 But self-regulation also frequently introduces 
monitoring aspects, which have the potential to convert previ-
ously unknowable information, such as compliance with the fair 
wage policy, into something knowable.304
297 See infra notes 303–14.  
298 See Tracey M. Roberts, The Rise of Rule Four Institutions: Voluntary 
Standards, Certification and Labeling Systems, 40 ECOLOGY L. Q. 107, 123–
24 n.78 (2013). For example, fair labor regulations lead to fair labor practices 
which lead to goods that have been produced with an ethical provenance, a 
credence quality. See id. 
299 Id.
300 See id. (“Examples of goods with this type of credence quality include 
goods that are ... manufactured using fair labor practices.”).  
301 See id. (“Even where desirable qualities might inhere in the end prod-
uct, consumers may also be unable to determine whether their preferences 
are being met because testing for these desirable qualities would be prohibi-
tively expensive.”).  
302 See supra Sections I.A.1 and I.A.2. 
303 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1604 (noting that breaches of regulatory 
provisions are often first discovered during inspections and audits). 
304 See id. (explaining how, with commercial contracts, the supplier may be 
monitored for breaches and, if found, the previously unknown information is 
communicated to the buyer who can take corrective action).  
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 Monitoring regulatory compliance becomes necessary be-
cause having a contract impose process-related obligations is not 
enough to ensure compliance.305 Companies might ignore their 
obligations in the absence of verification and enforcement be-
cause the beneficial activities required by many regulatory stand-
ards increase the costs of these profit-maximizing companies.306
For example, numerous multinational buyers have discovered 
that the actual conduct of their suppliers has deviated greatly 
from the suppliers’ contractual promises to abide by particular 
codes of conduct.307 Due to the economic and reputational risks 
associated with having such conduct exposed publicly, many 
buyers take measures to verify and enforce compliance within a 
supply chain in addition to seeking the promises of their suppli-
ers to comply.308
 In many instances, buyers secure inspection rights in order 
to verify compliance with regulatory and other standards.309 The 
master supply agreements of original equipment manufacturers, 
for example, “give buyers the right to: inspect the supplier’s plant 
with or without notice, review and audit its quality control sys-
tems and quality control reports, and audit its books and/or other 
records.”310 Regardless of whether performed by a buyer or a 
third party, an audit of a supply chain provides a confidential 
mechanism for monitoring conduct proactively and determining 
appropriate safeguards before unfavorable conduct becomes pub-
licly known.311
 The audits and other mechanisms used for inspection 
provide buyers with access to considerable amounts of infor-
mation.312 An audit of suppliers, for example, should provide a 
buyer with information about compliance with regulatory provi-
sions and often will provide information about compliance with 
305 See Lin, supra note 20, at 723 (having a contract or code of compliance 
does not mean compliance is guaranteed).  
306 See Graeme Auld et al., Transnational Private Governance Between the 
Logics of Empowerment and Control, 9 REG. & GOVERNANCE 108, 111 (2015). 
307 See Lin, supra note 20, at 723. 
308 See id. at 727.
309 See id. at 726 (noting a preference for verification through auditing). 
310 Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 89, at 583 (footnotes omitted). 
311 See Lin, supra note 20, at 726–27. 
312 See Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 89, at 583.  
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general performance obligations too.313 Information about events 
within the supply chain then would become known, as a result of 
the audit, or could become reasonably knowable, as a result of 
the inspection right (even if not exercised).314
 The consequence of having additional information made 
available to taxpayers through rights of inspection depends on 
whether the fixed prongs of the all events tests follow a knowable 
standard.315 At a minimum, taxpayers presumably could not ignore 
known information discovered through audits.316 For example, if 
an audit reveals noncompliance with regulatory provisions, then 
the taxpayer should determine a fixed right or liability by account-
ing for the effect of known noncompliance on any conditions or 
performance obligations. 
 Unknown, but knowable, information would cause more 
problems if fixed rights and liabilities are determined from 
knowable events. A right of inspection could place a taxpayer in 
an unenviable position where a supplier’s noncompliance was 
reasonably knowable, but not yet known. Expecting the taxpayer 
to account for unknown information can seem unrealistic and 
unfair; however, allowing the taxpayer to account for only 
known information can create opportunities for abuse and runs 
counter to the idea that events—rather than knowledge—fix 
rights and liabilities.317 As noted above, authorities and guid-
ance have yet to definitively state whether a knowable standard 
applies to the fixed prongs of the all events tests.318 Without 
such clarification, taxpayers have little indication about how to 
account for the increasing amount of information becoming 
knowable through the insertion of inspection rights into many 
regulatory provisions.319
313 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1611 (“While the main focus [of monitoring] 
is on the regulatory compliance, clearly the overall contractual performance is 
subject to more intense monitoring than the ordinary commercial contract.”). 
314 Cf. Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 89, at 583; Lin, supra note 
20, at 727 (audit produced information).  
315 See supra notes 265–68 and accompanying text.  
316 See Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 89, at 583; Cafaggi, supra
note 12, at 1611 (addressing information discovered from audits and monitoring). 
317 See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 239, 243–44 (1987). 
318 See supra Section I.B.
319 See id.
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II. ACCEPTANCE REQUIREMENTS AS CONDITIONS 
UNDER THE ALL EVENTS TESTS
 The all events tests can and should accommodate self-
regulation in sales and other transactions better. The concerns 
expressed above about conditions, performance, virtual certainty, 
and knowable information admittedly indicate that someone needs 
a hobby. But the all events tests should provide a sound basis 
for tax accruals regardless of the complexity of a transaction. 
That basis is lacking insofar as the tests emphasize the signifi-
cance of contractual promises for determining rights and liabili-
ties,320 but applications of the tests can simultaneously gloss 
over uncertainty about the fulfillment of those promises.321 The 
applications look haphazard in the selection of only certain as-
pects of complex relationships in determining what events might 
affect rights and liabilities. Busy practitioners might under-
standably determine accruals for sales of goods and services by 
ignoring the requirements of increasingly common regulatory 
provisions;322 however, the all events tests should provide a sound 
basis for such accruals apart from practical needs to file timely 
returns. This Part explores how the all events tests could regain 
soundness by recognizing implied acceptance requirements as 
conditions to rights and liabilities. 
A. Acceptance as a Condition 
 An express requirement for customer acceptance has gen-
erally been regarded as an event that must occur before a right 
or liability can become fixed under the all events tests.323 For 
example, the Service has found that a seller lacked a fixed right 
320 See, e.g., Decision, Inc. v. Comm’r, 47 T.C. 58, 63 (1966) (noting how a 
taxpayer lacked a fixed right to receive income, after changing terms in its 
contracts with customers, under the all events test), acq., 1967-2 C.B. 2. 
321 See, e.g., Harkins v. Comm’r, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1547, 1551 (2001) (finding a 
fixed right to income, where payments were “earned under the agreement 
only if the [taxpayer] was in full compliance with the performance require-
ments,” because “[t]here is no evidence in the record indicating that the [tax-
payer] did not perform as called for in the agreement”); GERTZMAN, supra
note 232, ¶ 4.03[1][b] (noting that courts require accruals because “the tax-
payer’s compliance with its agreement will generally be presumed”). 
322 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1571–72. 
323 See also infra note 325 and accompanying text. 
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to amounts billed by the seller—but withheld by a buyer—for 
delivered goods where such amounts were not payable under their 
contract until the buyer accepted the goods.324 Required acceptance, 
which completes a sale, thus can function as a condition prece-
dent to a fixed right or liability.325
 Yet the Service has minimized the significance of express 
acceptance in certain severable service contracts.326 The Service 
had examined a corporation’s milestone-based contracts that ob-
ligated the federal government to make individual milestone 
payments only after the government inspected and accepted each 
completed severable service.327 Despite recognizing acceptance as a 
condition precedent to each payment (i.e., a condition to an amount 
becoming due), the Service noted how the corporation completed 
the milestone services and earned the corresponding portions of 
its income before the government accepted the completed work.328
Under the Service’s formulaic approach of identifying a fixed 
right to income upon the earliest of it being due, paid, or earned,329
the Service found that the rights to income were fixed when 
earned through the completion of each severable, but unaccepted, 
performance obligation in the contacts.330
324 See Rev. Rul. 69-314, 1969-1 C.B. 139; accord Rev. Proc. 2019-43, 2019-48 
I.R.B. 1107 § 16.09 (listing, among the methods eligible for automatic consent, a 
change in the treatment of retainages to a method consistent with the holding of 
Revenue Ruling 69-314 with respect to receivables or payables). 
325 See, e.g., Ringmaster, Inc. v. Comm’r, 1962 T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 62-187, at 
1134 (“A sale contract which makes acceptance of the subject matter dependent 
upon inspection or testing by the purchaser creates such a condition prece-
dent and prevents accrual of the purchase price by the seller until such tests 
and inspections have been made.”), dismissed per curiam, 319 F.2d 860 (8th 
Cir. 1963); Webb Press Co., v. Comm’r, 3 B.T.A. 247, 253 (1925) (finding the 
completion of a sale contingent on the purchaser’s testing and acceptance of a 
good), acq., 1927-1 C.B. 6; Priv. Let. Rul. 2003-10-003 (Mar. 7, 2003); cf. Priv. 
Let. Rul. 98-23-003 (Feb. 18, 1998) (finding no fixed right to income until cus-
tomers choose to purchase acceptable goods under the taxpayer’s policy that 
creates no obligation to purchase a finished good “with which the customer is 
not completely satisfied”). 
326 See Tech. Adv. Mem. 2009-03-079 (Jan. 16, 2009). 
327 See id.
328 See id.
329 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
330 See Tech. Adv. Mem. 2009-03-079 (Jan. 16, 2009). 
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 This approach toward milestones is generally troubling 
for all taxpayers and especially problematic in the context of 
self-regulated relationships.331 It is troubling because the Ser-
vice found an unconditional right to receive income while simul-
taneously recognizing a conditional obligation to pay it.332 That 
odd result flows from approaching the fixed prong with a formula333
without appreciating that acceptance was an event that ultimately 
determined the corporation’s right to receive the income.334 Ac-
ceptance constrained the right, which is the focus of the all events 
test, even though the corporation could do the work to earn the 
income before acceptance occurred.335 An approach for accruals 
that relies on activities targeted by a formula, rather than assessing 
rights established by events, leads to troubling results.336
 More importantly, for self-regulated relationships, the 
willingness to rely on performance for identifying a fixed right 
placed too much emphasis on the corporation’s purported com-
pletion of its work.337 The parties expressed their mutual inten-
tion to regulate certain obligations through acceptance.338 The 
all events tests should not discount that intention and regard 
the corporation’s tendered performance as sufficient to fix their 
respective rights and liabilities. The tendering of performance 
conveys nothing more than a unilateral assertion of compliance 
with required performance obligations.339 The all events tests 
should not elevate the significance of that unilateral act where the 
parties explicitly made it subject to acceptance by the buyer. Oth-
erwise, the tests would invite speculation about the virtual cer-
tainty of compliance,340 knowable aspects of noncompliance,341 and 
other complications in deciding whether the seller had completed 
331 See Constructive Conditions, supra note 158, at 443 (2009).  
332 See id.
333 See id. at 438–63 (2009) (describing the Service’s oversimplified stand-
ards for income and expense recognition under the all events tests). 
334 See id. at 443. 
335 See id.
336 See id.
337 See id. at 448–52.  
338 See id. at 350. 
339 See id. at 350–51. 
340 See supra Section I.A.3. 
341 See supra Section I.B. 
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its performance as promised.342 Regrettably, the current tendency 
to associate fixed rights and liabilities with unilateral acts of as-
serted performance is incompatible with the increasing efforts of 
contracting parties to regulate often-unobservable aspects of 
their relationships. 
 In any event, the Service’s peculiar approach to express 
acceptance requirements for severable services remains at odds 
with the significance attached to such requirements for sales of 
goods.343 In both contexts, prior to a buyer’s acceptance, the seller’s 
right to income should remain contingent on acceptance occurring 
even if the seller has tendered performance. But the approach taken 
for severable services mistakenly suggests that express acceptance 
requirements produce different consequences for sales of ser-
vices than for sales of goods.344
 Despite permitting an express acceptance requirement to 
operate as a condition, the all events tests have evolved without 
attributing similar significance to implied acceptance require-
ments.345 Reading implied conditions into agreements might 
seem unnecessary for tax purposes given that, if a party has per-
formed as promised, the performance alone should fix associated 
rights and liabilities. However, the UCC346—and to some degree, 
the common law347—recognize acceptance as implied conditions 
342 See infra Section II.B. 
343 Cf. IRS Field Serv. Adv. 1999 FSA LEXIS 382 (June 25, 1999) (distin-
guishing the permitted deferral of income recognition until a sale of merchandise, 
where such sale occurs upon the acceptance of the goods, from the required imme-
diate recognition of income from sales of services because, “while ... customers 
may dispute the charges for the services, the services have been provided”). 
344 Id.
345 See supra Section I.A.2. 
346 See infra notes 350–65 and accompanying text. 
347 Courts insert constructive conditions into contracts to make, for exam-
ple, a buyer’s obligation to pay depend on a seller’s completed performance. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 226; id. § 226 cmt. c. (AM. L.
INST. 1981). These conditions help preserve expectations about the exchange 
such that the buyer would not have to pay unless the seller actually fulfills 
its promise. For this purpose, the seller’s substantial performance is regarded 
as equivalent to full performance where the seller has deviated in only trivial, 
minor, or nonessential ways from its promise. See id. § 237 cmt. d. The doctrine of 
substantial performance thereby protects a seller that makes a good faith effort 
to perform against the potential forfeiture that could otherwise result if an un-
reasonable buyer would reject any performance falling short of an unobtainable 
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on payment obligations. Although legal enforceability might not 
serve as a touchstone for fixed rights and liabilities under the all 
events tests,348 the tests should operate by consistently respect-
ing the conditions expressed by contracting parties and those 
conditions implied by law.349
 For example, Article 2 of the UCC, which applies to transac-
tions in goods,350 recognizes a seller’s obligation to deliver goods 
and a buyer’s obligation to accept the goods before paying for 
them as promised.351 Rather than regarding the buyer’s payment 
standard of perfection. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity’s Modification of Con-
tract: An Analysis of the Twentieth Century’s Equitable Reformation of Con-
tract Law, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 265, 299 (1999); see also William H. Lawrence, 
Appropriate Standards for a Buyer’s Refusal to Keep Goods Tendered by a 
Seller, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1640 (1994) (noting that the substantial 
performance doctrine does not apply to the sale of goods under the UCC, 
which uses the perfect tender rule, because a breaching seller can often avoid 
forfeiture by reselling nonconforming goods whereas a seller of nonconform-
ing services, for example, usually cannot resell the services). Therefore, inso-
far as the seller substantially performs, the constructive condition is deemed 
satisfied and the buyer becomes obligated to pay the contract price (albeit 
reduced by damages for any defective performance). The common law thus 
“provides that substantial performance mandates acceptance” by the buyer. 
DiMatteo, supra, at 299. 
Conversely, if the seller materially breaches its performance obligation 
(i.e., fails to substantially perform as promised), then the unsatisfied constructive 
condition prevents the buyer from having an obligation to pay. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (AM. L. INST. 1981). But the buyer could still 
accept—through word or deed—the seller’s nonconforming performance. See 
id. §§ 246(1), 247. The buyer has discretion either to (1) assert that the seller 
breached the contract, which prevents the buyer’s payment from becoming 
due, or (2) accept the otherwise defective performance, which waives the con-
dition on the payment obligation. Because acceptance would waive an unsat-
isfied condition, the buyer’s acceptance rather than the seller’s performance 
would establish the obligation to pay the contract price (without forfeiting 
rights to damages for the defective performance). See id. § 246 cmt. b. 
Therefore, the common law finds a payment obligation either where a buyer 
should accept full or substantial performance as a matter of course or where a 
buyer has accepted materially nonconforming performance. See id. § 246. 
348 See supra notes 163–72 and accompanying text. 
349 See Constructive Conditions, supra note 158, at 469–70. 
350 See U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). 
351 See id. § 2-301. The parties’ obligations should consider “usage of trade, 
course of dealing and performance, and the general background of circum-
stances.” Id. § 2-301 cmt. 
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obligation as entirely independent of the seller’s delivery obliga-
tion,352 the UCC generally permits the buyer to inspect and accept 
the goods before the obligation to pay ripens.353 The seller’s right to 
receive and the buyer’s obligation to make payment thus depend 
on an implied requirement of the buyer’s prior acceptance.354
 The implied acceptance requirement meshes with the per-
fect tender rule under the UCC.355 The perfect tender rule per-
mits a buyer to reject, in good faith, nonconforming goods, even 
where nonconformity results from a seller’s trivial deviation 
from promised performance.356 This rule incorporates “the prop-
osition that the seller’s complete performance is a warranty and 
a condition precedent to the buyer’s obligation to pay.”357 The 
UCC implies an acceptance requirement to preserve a buyer’s 
352 See id. § 2-301 cmt. (“This section uses the term ‘obligation’ in contrast 
to the term ‘duty’ in order to provide for the ‘condition’ aspects of delivery and 
payment ....”). 
353 See id. §§ 2-513(1), 2-607(1). 
354 See id. § 2-607 cmt. 1 (“[O]nce the buyer accepts a tender the seller ac-
quires a right to its price on the contract terms.”). 
355 See infra note 356 and accompanying text. 
356 See U.C.C. §§ 2-601, 2-106 cmt. 2 (describing a “policy of requiring ex-
act performance by the seller of his obligations as a condition to his right to 
require acceptance”). The perfect tender rule does not apply to goods deliv-
ered pursuant to an installment contract. See id. § 2-601. An installment con-
tract authorizes or requires the delivery of goods in separate lots, where the 
buyer can accept each lot separately. See id. § 2-612(1). A buyer can reject an 
individual installment only where nonconformity “substantially impairs the 
value of that installment and cannot be cured.” Id. § 2-612(2). Consequently, 
unless the nonconformity “substantially impairs the value of the whole con-
tract,” the buyer must accept the nonconforming installment upon receiving 
the seller’s adequate assurances of its cure. Id. §§ 2-612(2)–(3). The height-
ened standard of substantial impairment arguably helps preserve a long-
term contractual relationship that might break down if a buyer could reject 
an installment for trivial deviations, see Lawrence, supra note 347, at 1654–
56, or if the buyer seeks to benefit from market prices that declined over the 
period between contract execution and the delivery of the installment, which 
might exceed a comparable period for a single-delivery contract. See George 
L. Priest, Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods Under 
the Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic Approach, 91 HARV. L. REV. 960, 
972 (1978). 
357 Steven W. Feldman, Recession, Restitution, and the Principle of Fair 
Redress: A Response to Professors Brooks and Stremitzer, 47 VAL. U. L. REV.
399, 413 (2013). 
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right to reject tendered goods under this rule and to establish 
acceptance as the conditional event for an obligation to pay for 
goods that have not been rejected.358 To achieve these objectives 
in the absence of a buyer’s explicit approval, the UCC will infer 
acceptance from the buyer’s conduct, which might include failing 
to reject goods after having a reasonable opportunity to inspect 
them or acting in a manner contrary to the seller’s ownership of 
the goods.359 Implied acceptance requirements thereby help es-
tablish a mutually acknowledged payment obligation insofar as 
the actions of both parties appear consistent with their under-
standing that performance has occurred as promised.360
 Significantly, acceptance under the UCC can establish an 
unconditional payment obligation for nonconforming goods.361 A 
buyer can knowingly or unknowingly accept—expressly or im-
plicitly—nonconforming goods tendered by a seller where the 
goods were otherwise rejectable under the perfect tender rule.362
Such acceptance gives the seller a right to the agreed upon 
price363 even though the buyer may still seek damages related to 
the nonconformity.364 Acceptance thus establishes a payment 
obligation for goods as tendered regardless of whether the seller 
performed as promised.365
 Because current applications of the all events tests fail to 
recognize implied acceptance requirements, they allow a unilateral 
358 See U.C.C. § 2-601. 
359 See id. §§ 2-606(1)(b)–(c); see also id. § 2-606 cmt. 1 (using a buyer’s 
“words, action, or silence when it is time to speak” as the basis for finding 
acceptance). 
360 See id. §§ 2-607(1)–(2). 
361 Id.
362 See id. § 2-601; see also id. § 2-602 cmt. 1 (“A tender or delivery of goods 
made pursuant to a contract of sale, even though wholly non-conforming, re-
quires affirmative action by the buyer to avoid acceptance.”). 
363 See U.C.C. § 2-607(1); see also Justin Sweet, Completion, Acceptance 
and Waiver of Claims: Back to Basics, 17 FORUM 1312, 1314 (1982) (analogizing 
a tender of nonconforming goods to an offer of a lesser amount in full satisfac-
tion of a debt, which the creditor could choose to accept). 
364 See U.C.C. §§ 2-714(1), 2-601 cmt. 1 (“A buyer accepting a non-conforming 
tender is not penalized by the loss of any remedy otherwise open to him.”). A 
buyer must notify the seller within a reasonable time after the buyer discov-
ers or should have discovered the nonconformity; otherwise, the buyer’s claim 
for damages is barred. See id. § 2-607(3). 
365 Id. § 2-607(1). 
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assertion of compliance with a performance obligation to fix a right 
to income and liability to pay.366 These performance-focused ap-
plications favor an approach whereby one party’s claimed per-
formance is regarded as enough to fix the rights and liabilities 
under an agreement.367 If the other party objects to the perfor-
mance, current applications of the tests view a resulting dispute—
which necessarily arises after performance has occurred—as giving 
rise to an unsatisfied condition precedent that prevents or post-
pones an accrual of income or deduction.368 In essence, the tests 
366 See supra Section I.A.2. 
367 See supra notes 100–05 and accompanying text. 
368 Existing authorities and guidance find performance sufficient to fix an 
associated right to income and liability to pay. See supra Section I.A. Inexpli-
cably, they also construe a post-performance dispute as giving rise to an un-
satisfied condition precedent that leaves the right and liability unsettled, 
even though the earlier performance should have presumably fixed them. See
Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1930). One might instead 
question whether a legitimate dispute between the parties makes evident 
that a party failed to perform as promised and that such failure—rather than 
the dispute—prevents each party from having a fixed right or liability. 
Nevertheless, this approach of constructing a dispute-resolution condition 
offers a practical way to deal with questionable performance. For example, if 
a seller unknowingly tendered nonconforming performance and the buyer 
rightfully rejected the performance, then the condition precedent approach 
easily and properly postpones accruals until the resolution of any resulting 
dispute. See supra Section I.A. The construction of a condition produces a 
manageable deferral by shifting the focus of the all events tests to the ob-
servable unresolved status of the dispute and away from the contested ful-
fillment of the promise. Conversely, where a dispute arises from the buyer’s 
wrongful rejection of the seller’s conforming performance, the condition prec-
edent approach thankfully avoids dealing with unknown, but potentially 
knowable, facts about performance. See supra Section I.A. Although a per-
formance-focused all events test might justifiably find the occurrence of knowa-
ble performance sufficient to fix a right or liability, the condition precedent 
approach understandably opts for the ease of just postponing accruals until 
resolution of the dispute 
The recognition of implied acceptance requirements under the all events 
tests could offer a similarly useful but theoretically preferable approach for 
accruals. Like dispute resolution, acceptance works as a readily identifiable 
marker of the event needed to fix a right or liability. See supra notes 323–25 
and accompanying text. However, acceptance provides a uniform, principled 
marker for both conforming and nonconforming performances. This consistency is 
lacking in applications of the all events tests that initially link rights and lia-
bilities to performances but eventually couple them with the resolution of 
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get applied by fabricating a condition tied to resolving a dispute 
about performance and simultaneously ignoring the legally im-
plied requirement to have such performance accepted.369 In 
short, current applications of the tests do not require acceptable 
performance to fix a right or liability; however, they will aban-
don their performance-focused approaches370 if someone actually 
objects to the performance.371
 If parties were assured of receiving promised performances, 
then the all events tests could justifiably and feasibly treat the 
completion of those performances as fixing rights and liabili-
ties.372 However, taxpayers know that performances vary from 
promises, and promises often address expectations about far-
ranging operational activities that provide many opportunities 
for noncompliance.373 As a result, the difficulty of applying a per-
formance-focused all events test where, for example, delivered 
goods fail to meet agreed upon physical specifications (e.g., goods 
fabricated with substandard steel) starts to compound where 
goods meet physical specifications but conflict with process-
related performance expectations (e.g., goods fabricated under 
prohibited, abusive labor practices).374 Moreover, where the par-
ties seek to preserve relationships and work together to resolve 
nonconformity issues, a performance-focused analysis would be-
come administratively complex if consideration is given to the 
parties’ willingness to tolerate certain performance deviations in 
order to sustain the relationship.375 It is foreseeable that these 
disputes as if performance has lost its relevance. Moreover, the approach of 
constructing dispute-resolution conditions has yet to explain how to account 
for nonconforming performance if a dispute (i.e., the unsatisfied condition 
precedent) does not arise until a subsequent taxable year. See Rev. Rul. 2003-
10, 2003-1 C.B. 289. An acceptance-based approach could find a fixed right or 
liability upon the acceptance of nonconforming performance even if a dispute 
might arise later.  
369 Cf. Dravo Corp. v. United States, 348 F.2d 542, 545 (Ct. Cl. 1965).  
370 Id. (noting a departure from traditional accrual accounting for contested 
liabilities). 
371 Id.
372 See Rev. Rul. 98-39, 1998-2 C.B. 199. 
373 See Rev. Rul. 2003-10, 2003-1 C.B. 288–89. 
374 See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
375 See Rev. Rul. 2003-10, 2003-1 C.B. 290 (questioning how a course of 
dealings might affect an analysis under the all events tests with respect to 
defective products). 
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difficulties could lead to a performance-focused analysis that 
finds a fixed right or liability from a semblance of performance 
cobbled together from the absence of a dispute and an assumed 
willingness to disregard nonconformity.376 Ambiguity about how 
far parties can deviate from their promises and still fix rights 
and liabilities makes the continued devotion to performance-focused 
applications perplexing.377 The all events tests could instead op-
erate more soundly by asking whether the buyer accepted per-
formance in whatever manner tendered. 
 By recognizing implied acceptance conditions, the all 
events tests could sidestep many complex issues in dealing with 
performance. Once acceptance occurs, it does not matter whether 
performance occurred as promised; what activities were ministe-
rial; whether conformity or nonconformity was knowable to or 
virtually certain from either party; or how the parties might deal 
with nonconformity in ongoing relationships.378 Like express ac-
ceptance, implied acceptance of tendered performance would 
serve as an identifiable event that can fix the rights and liabili-
ties of contracting parties for tax purposes in self-regulated and 
other contexts.379
 Furthermore, the recognition of implied acceptance require-
ments would better align the all events tests with the intentions 
of parties that self-regulate and the legal rights and liabilities of 
those parties.380 Self-regulation involves important aspects of 
standard setting, compliance verification, and enforcement.381
These efforts demonstrate an intention to define and control ac-
ceptable performance rather than to hope that a party will tender 
376 See id. at 289 (finding that a manufacturer had a fixed right to income 
under the all events test in the year it shipped too many goods because, upon 
discovery in a subsequent taxable year, the customer did not dispute that the 
manufacturer had shipped the wrong quantity of items and the customer 
agreed to pay for the excess shipment). But cf. Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chem. 
& Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565, 574 (7th Cir. 1985) (recognizing a buyer’s legal ob-
ligation to pay for an excess quantity of delivered goods under the Illinois 
Commercial Code because the buyer had implicitly accepted them by failing 
to reject the nonconforming excess). 
377 See Rev. Rul. 2003-10, 2003-1 C.B. 289. 
378 See Just Enough, supra note 56, at 474. 
379 See Rev. Rul. 2003-10, 2003-1 C.B. 289. 
380 See Constructive Conditions, supra note 158, at 447–48. 
381 See McAllister, supra note 5, at 306–07. 
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conforming performance. The all events tests should likewise focus 
on rights and liabilities established by the acceptance of perfor-
mance instead of looking for rights and liabilities under an as-
sumption that parties might perform as promised. This approach of 
requiring acceptance would also provide a more logical connec-
tion between the unconditional rights and liabilities under the 
all events tests and the legal rights and liabilities of contracting 
parties. For instance, postponing a seller’s accrual of income un-
til the buyer accepts performance makes more sense than saying 
the seller’s performance established an unconditional right to 
receive income for tax purposes despite the fact that the buyer 
has no legal obligation to pay for the performance (or possibly 
even accept the performance). The recognition of implied ac-
ceptance as conditions to rights and liabilities under the all events 
tests would better align tax accruals with the reality of many 
business transactions. 
B. Disputes About Performance 
 In addition to recognizing that a buyer might accept ei-
ther conforming or nonconforming performance, the all events 
tests must accommodate disputes about potentially nonconform-
ing aspects of performance. Despite accepting a seller’s tender, a 
buyer might assert that its payment obligation differs from the 
contract price because the seller did not fulfill its contractual 
promises.382 Consequently, the all events tests must anticipate 
and account for disputes about nonconforming performance that 
might ultimately determine what, if anything, the buyer must 
pay for the seller’s actual performance. 
 As noted above, current applications of the all events tests 
treat a bona fide dispute as establishing an unsatisfied condition 
precedent that generally prevents or postpones accruals of the 
promised payment by both the buyer and seller.383 Therefore, a 
dispute about allegedly nonconforming performance presumably 
forestalls an accrual prior to its resolution.384 Once, for example, 
the parties reach a settlement or a court enters a final judgment 
382 See Rev. Rul. 2003-10, 2003-1 C.B. 289. 
383 Id.
384 Id.
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about the payment obligation, the resolution satisfies the condition 
precedent and establishes the amount and timing of accruals re-
lated to the tendered performance.385
 By treating a dispute as an unsatisfied condition prece-
dent, current applications of the all events tests might neglect 
obligations to pay that were fixed by acceptance. For example, a 
buyer’s acceptance of nonconforming goods establishes the buy-
er’s obligation to pay the full contract price under the UCC.386
The acceptance compels the buyer to return performance through 
payment and precludes the buyer from rejecting the goods later 
due to the nonconformity.387 The buyer can still seek a remedy, 
including damages, for the nonconformity;388 however, the buyer 
must pay the agreed upon price for the accepted goods.389 There-
fore, a dispute about allegedly nonconforming performance for 
accepted goods will normally involve a buyer’s entitlement to a 
remedy rather than the buyer’s responsibility to pay the con-
tract price.390
 Therefore, even for disputed performance, the all events tests 
should take a payment obligation into account when goods or ser-
vices are accepted.391 Like the UCC, the all events tests should 
recognize that acceptance fixes the obligation to pay a determi-
nable amount.392 Any dispute about nonconforming aspects should 
385 See H. Liebes & Co. v. Comm’r, 90 F.2d 932, 938–39 (9th Cir. 1937). 
386 See U.C.C. § 2-607(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). 
387 See id. § 2-607(2); see also Kalzip, Inc. v. TL Hill Constr., LLC, 80 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. 2d 832 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (“[E]ven if the delivery of conforming goods 
could be deemed a condition precedent, [the buyer] waived compliance with 
that condition precedent by accepting the goods. Since [the buyer] accepted 
the goods, it is limited to an action for breach.”).  
388 See U.C.C. § 2-714(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). 
389 See id. § 2-607(1). 
390 See id.
391 Under the common law, as long as either the buyer must accept the 
seller’s immaterial deviations or the buyer has chosen to accept the seller’s 
material breaches, the buyer becomes obligated to pay the contract price de-
spite retaining the right to seek damages for nonconforming performance. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 246 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
392 Current applications of the all events tests require parties to accrue the 
uncontested portion of a payment obligation. See Johnson v. Comm’r, 6 T.C.M. 
255, 257–58 (1947). The partial accrual of a promised payment could contradict the 
fact that the buyer—without surrendering any right to a remedy—assumes legal 
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not delay accruals even though the dispute might result in an ad-
justment to the amount paid, such as through a setoff.393 An un-
resolved dispute might affect the amount eventually paid; how-
ever, the possibility of adjustment does not change the need to 
account for rights and liabilities fixed by acceptance.394
 The resolution of a dispute about nonconforming perfor-
mance for accepted goods or services might accordingly require a 
post-acceptance adjustment.395 When they eventually resolve 
their dispute, the contracting parties should preferably account 
for any difference between their prior accruals resulting from 
the acceptance and any modified obligation resulting from the 
dispute resolution.396 This approach seems particularly desirable 
responsibility for the entire purchase price by accepting the tendered perfor-
mance. Cf. PATRICIA F. FONSECA & JOHN R. FONSECA, WILLISTON ON SALES
§ 25:32, 820 (5th ed. 2006) (“Conformity of the goods tendered by the seller to 
the buyer will be presumed after the buyer has made an acceptance and the 
burden of establishing any breach is on that buyer.”). 
393 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-717 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (“The 
buyer on notifying the seller of his intention to do so may deduct all or any 
part of the damages resulting from any breach of the contract from any part 
of the price still due under the same contract.”). Under the UCC, acceptance 
establishes a payment obligation of the contract price less any damages for 
nonconforming performance. See Tegrant Alloyd Brands, Inc. v. Merch. of 
Tennis, Inc., 73 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 486 (Jan. 26, 2011) (“Although 
the seller’s breach does not excuse the contractual obligations of the buyer, 
the buyer is permitted to withhold from the purchase price its actual damages 
and breaches its obligations only to the extent the amount withheld exceeds 
its damages.” (citing Baccus Indus., Inc. v. Frontier Mech. Contractors, 36 
S.W.3d 579, 585–86 (Tex. App. 2000))). Disputes about nonperformance relate 
to the amount of the payment obligation rather than the existence of the obliga-
tion. Accordingly, the parties should take the payment obligation into account 
when acceptance occurs and account for potential damages in determining 
the amount with reasonable accuracy. See Cont’l Tie & Lumber Co. v. United 
States, 286 U.S. 290, 295–96 (1932). 
394 See Pac. Vegetable Oil Corp. v. Comm’r, 26 T.C. 1, 19 (1956) (“[T]he 
contingency of having to make adjustments in invoice prices [due to differ-
ences between the weight of delivered items and the weight specified in a 
sales contract] does not prevent the accrual of income in the year in which the 
right to income under the sales contract became fixed.” (citation omitted)), 
rev’d on other issues, 251 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1957). 
395 See id. at 18. 
396 See id.
Although adjustment might be made in the amount of the in-
voice price after determination of [the delivered items’] weight, 
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given that parties might resolve certain claims about noncon-
forming performance through nonmonetary means.397 For exam-
ple, in lieu of monetary damages for an alleged breach, a buyer 
and seller might agree to operational changes that encourage 
future compliance with regulatory provisions and help preserve 
their long-term relationship. A post-acceptance adjustment would 
appropriately reflect any resolution about a payment obligation 
without altering the fact that acceptance fixed the underlying 
right or liability.398
 A post-acceptance adjustment for the resolution of a dis-
pute offers a straightforward way to apply the all events tests. 
The current approach of treating a dispute as a condition prece-
dent introduces uncertainty, for example, where a claim of non-
conforming performance arises from a discovery occurring in a 
year after goods or services were provided (i.e., how does a Year 
2 dispute affect a right established by Year 1 performance?).399
The all events tests should not have to resort to a post-year-end 
construction of unsatisfied condition precedent to address an al-
leged nonconformity. Instead, common sense suggests the parties 
should accrue income and expense items during the year goods 
this was, we believe, only part of and due to the seller’s war-
ranty, specific or implied, that it would deliver the quantity 
called for by the sales contract[ ] and that ... the buyer would 
not be charged for more goods than he received. 
Id.; David J. Joseph Co. v. Comm’r, 136 F.2d 410, 411 (5th Cir. 1943). 
In practically every contract of sale for merchandise there is 
an implied warranty of quality and quantity of the merchandise 
sold, for the breach of which the merchant would be liable to 
the buyer, but the breach would not develop prior to delivery, 
and the right to demand damages or a refund would not ac-
crue until its discovery. 
Id.
397 See Merchant Law, supra note 154, at 1798. 
398 See id. at 1808.
399 See Rev. Rul. 2003-10, 2003-1 C.B. 289 (requesting comments about the 
application of section 451 to shipments of defective products where disputes 
arise in a subsequent year). A condition precedent would not arise unless the 
parties dispute the nonconformity. See supra Section I.A.2. If the parties 
agree that nonconforming performance occurred (i.e., no dispute exists), then 
they must still determine whether the failure to perform as promised could 
have fixed rights and liabilities in an earlier year under the current perfor-
mance-focused applications of the all events tests. See id.
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or services are accepted (buyers must pay for what they accept) 
and report adjustments separately during any year disputes 
about nonconforming performance are resolved (the amounts owed 
might change even though the obligations to pay would not). 
 Finally, the all events tests should restrict the use of con-
ditions for nonconforming performance to situations where non-
conformities extinguish payment obligations. For example, the 
UCC permits a buyer of goods to revoke a prior acceptance if 
nonconformity substantially impairs the value of the goods to the 
buyer.400 Unless the buyer reasonably but mistakenly assumed—
prior to acceptance—that the seller would cure a known noncon-
formity, revocation is restricted to situations where the buyer’s 
acceptance was reasonably induced by either the difficulty of 
discovering the nonconformity prior to acceptance or the seller’s 
assurances about performance.401 Upon a timely notification of 
revocation, the UCC treats a revocation of acceptance like a re-
jection of goods insofar as neither option creates an obligation to 
pay the contract price for the goods.402 If the all events tests ac-
count for the rights and liabilities fixed by an initial acceptance, 
then the tests can easily account for the revocation as a condi-
tion subsequent that extinguishes those rights and liabilities re-
gardless of the year during which the revocation occurs.403 The 
all events tests could therefore use a simple approach of treating 
rights and liabilities as fixed by unrevoked acceptance even if a 
dispute exists about alleged nonconforming performance.404
400 See U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). The sub-
stantial impairment requirement for revocation places a higher burden on a 
buyer, who seeks to revisit a completed transaction, for goods that the buyer 
could have initially rejected with relative ease. See Priest, supra note 356, at 
972 (describing the higher burden as being sensitive to loss shifting where, 
due to the passage of time since acceptance, a buyer might otherwise attempt 
a revocation to benefit from changing market prices or to correct its selection 
of goods that later seem unsuitable). 
401 See U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). 
402 See id. § 2-608(3). 
403 How contracting parties might account for the performance that preceded 
a disputed or undisputed revocation of acceptance under current performance-
focused applications of the all events tests remains unclear. See supra note 
368 and accompanying text. 
404 See id.
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C. An Illustration of Implied Acceptance as a Condition 
 Gillis v. United States405 supplies a context for illustrating 
the role that implied acceptance could fill as a condition prece-
dent to the all events tests.406 Although the case does not involve 
regulatory provisions governing process-related aspects of a busi-
ness, Gillis applied the all events test to a supplier’s liability in 
the cotton industry, where trading happens under significant 
private regulation.407 The case helps highlight issues with non-
conforming performance, knowledge, and disputes in a self-
governing industry, and it provides a scenario for illustrating 
how acceptance could function as a condition precedent in de-
termining fixed rights and liabilities.408
 Within a single taxable year, the partnership in Gillis
sold and shipped bales of cotton to a foreign buyer as well as re-
ceived full payment of the contract prices from the buyer.409 The 
contracts provided that the buyer could later make claims for 
breach if the buyer received cotton that varied from the specifi-
cations stated in the contracts.410 The contracts further provided 
that the parties would settle any dispute over such claims 
through an arbitration procedure established for international 
cotton trade.411
 The partnership in Gillis had knowingly shipped cotton 
grown in a region that experienced heavy rainfall, which meant 
the partnership knew—at the time of shipment—that it was us-
ing cotton of an inferior grade than promised in the contract and 
that the buyer would make claims against the partnership.412
The buyer eventually made twelve claims against the partnership, 
and the partnership paid four claims immediately and refused 
405 402 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1968). 
406 Id. at 508–09. 
407 See Cotton Industry, supra note 157, 1726–45 (describing procedural rules, 
substantive rules, and adjudication in the cotton industry); id. at 1724 (“The 
cotton industry has almost entirely opted out of the public legal system, replacing 
it with one of the oldest and most complex systems of private commercial law.”). 
408 See generally, Gillis, 402 F.2d at 501. 
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the others.413 After pursuing certain appeals, the partnership paid 
the amounts awarded at the conclusion of the designated arbitra-
tion procedures for the remaining eight claims414—notwithstanding
that payment occurred after three more years of resistance and 
under a threat of judicial intervention.415
 For the year of shipment, the accrual-method partnership 
in Gillis included the payments it received in gross income and 
concurrently took a deduction equal to the amount that the partner-
ship calculated it would owe for all of the buyer’s anticipated 
claims.416 The Service sought to disallow the deduction by por-
traying the claims as contingent liabilities that, consistent with 
ample case law, could not become fixed prior to a final resolution 
of the disputes.417 But the Gillis court found judicial contests of 
liability—such as the litigated claims regarded as contingent li-
abilities in the case law cited by the Service—“materially distin-
guishable” from the arbitration procedures applicable to the 
buyer’s claims in Gillis.418 The court described arbitration in the 
cotton industry as less adversative than traditional litigation and 
noted how such claims, which were routine under industry norms, 
“sting” less than disputes heard in judicial trials.419 Those dif-
ferences led the court to remark: “We do not see anticipated 
claims regularly disposed of by arbitration as the handmaiden of 
contingency.”420 As a result, the court refused to “penalize the 
partnership for using the arbitration procedure” and treated the 
claims submitted to arbitration as having been unconditionally 




415 Gillis v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 547, 553 (S.D. Tex. 1966), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part, 402 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1968). 
416 Gillis, 402 F.2d at 508 (describing the partnership’s damage calculation 
as “the difference in the price paid [by the buyer] and the price of the cotton 
actually shipped”). 
417 Id. at 509; see also 1968 A.O.D. Lexis 293 (Dec. 27, 1968) (finding that, 
when the partnership shipped the inferior cotton, “there existed only possible 
liabilities” for the buyer’s claims). 
418 Gillis, 402 F.2d at 509. 
419 Id.
420 Id.
421 Id. at 510. 
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Gillis departs from a traditional application of the all events 
tests in two notable respects.422 First, the case attaches significance 
to knowledge about nonconforming performance even though the 
case fails to explore the full import of such knowledge.423 Other 
courts have denied deductions for anticipated claims arising from 
nonconforming performance where taxpayers lacked knowledge 
about their defective performances by year-end,424 even where 
such defects were presumably knowable.425 In contrast, the Gillis
Court emphasized that the partnership knew its shipment of in-
ferior goods established its liability despite its later refusal to 
pay some asserted claims.426 In light of the private legal system that 
has largely governed the cotton trade since the mid-1800s,427 one 
might infer that the partnership in Gillis knew of its fixed liability 
and merely contested the amount of liability. The partnership’s 
contracts followed industry norms428 by allowing the buyer’s 
422 See Recent Case, Income Tax—When Items Become Deductible—Damage 
Claims Which Were Reasonably Estimated and Which Were Predictable with High 
Accuracy Could Be Accrued and Deducted Before Final Settlement—Gillis v. 
United States, 402 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1968), 83 HARV. L. REV. 1452, 1453 
(1970) [hereinafter Recent Case]. 
423 See Gillis, 402 F.2d at 508–10 (expressing repeatedly that the partner-
ship knew the goods were nonconforming). 
424 See, e.g., Challenge Publ’ns, Inc. v. Comm’r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 342, 349 
(1986) (finding reliance on Gillis misplaced because being “virtually certain ... 
still falls short of the absolute certainty required in order for a liability to be 
fixed”), aff’d, 845 F.2d 1541 (9th Cir. 1988); W.J. Strickland Co. v. Comm’r, 33 
T.C.M. (CCH) 484, 487 (1974) (finding Gillis distinguishable from a situation 
where the CEO was “shocked” to learn about the company’s manufacturing 
defect); Gateway Transp. Co. v. United States, 39 A.F.T.R.2d 77-647, 77-654 
(W.D. Wis. 1976) (“By contrast [to the situation in Gillis], there is no sugges-
tion here that plaintiff knew ....”); 1994 F.S.A. LEXIS 283 (Mar. 23, 1994) (distin-
guishing Gillis from a situation where products were not sold with known defects). 
425 See W.J. Strickland, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 487 (manufacturing defect 
discovered on last day of tax year during product installation); Gateway 
Transp., 39 A.F.T.R.2d 77-647, 77-655 (“[I]t cannot be said that plaintiff’s lia-
bility was determinable by the plaintiff at the very times at which the critical 
events occurred.”). 
426 See Gillis, 402 F.2d at 509. 
427 See Cotton Industry, supra note 157, at 1724–25. 
428 See id. at 1733 (contrasting the market-difference measurement of 
damages available to an aggrieved party in the cotton trade, which adjusts a 
contract price to market price, with the measurement of damages under the 
UCC, which protect expectancy interests). 
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claims to adjust the agreed upon contract prices to the prevail-
ing market prices for the quality of cotton actually delivered.429
When the partnership knowingly shipped inferior cotton, it was 
understood that the buyer became entitled to make claims.430
However, the industry has traditionally graded cotton through a 
subjective process.431 So the partnership would have been uncertain 
about the applicable market prices because the parties could have 
assigned different grades to the delivered cotton.432 Accordingly, 
references in Gillis to determining an appropriate price for the 
cotton through arbitration proceedings indicate that the court 
accepted the partnership’s unconditional liability for the claims 
and attributed the parties’ dispute to the claim amounts.433
 Knowledge helped identify the fixed liability because the 
partnership’s contracts—following industry norms—established 
an adjustment procedure for nonconforming performance.434 The 
parties had agreed on consequences for a delivery of inferior cotton, 
and the partnership’s nonconforming performance was the event 
that fixed its liability under their agreement.435 The partnership 
presumably should have accounted for its liability arising from 
its known nonconforming performance just like it would account 
for rights and liabilities fixed by other known events.436
429 See Gillis, 402 F.2d at 508. 
430 Id.
431 See Cotton Industry, supra note 157, at 1745. 
432 See id. at 1773–74. 
433 See also id. at 1773 (describing how the cotton “industry has created a 
separate ... [arbitration board] to deal with the most common type of fact-
based misunderstanding, namely disagreements over whether a delivery con-
forms to the contract’s quality specifications”). 
434 See Gillis, 402 F.2d at 508–09. 
435 Note that the liability became fixed in Gillis in the year before the buyer 
made its claims. See id. A claim submission can function as a condition prec-
edent that can delay an accrual, particularly where the likelihood of a claim 
is uncertain, such as consumer claims under product warranties. See Chrysler 
Corp. v. Comm’r., 436 F.3d 644, 650–51 (6th Cir. 2006). Alternatively, a claim 
submission can represent a ministerial act that will not delay an accrual, 
such as in circumstances like Gillis where business interests motivate claim 
submissions. See Rev. Rul. 98-39, 1998-2 C.B. 198, 199 (distinguishing claim 
submissions made to receive payment for cooperative advertising services). 
436 See Gillis, 402 F.2d at 506–07 (citing several cases where parties 
preemptively accounted for known future liabilities).  
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 Curiously, the actual knowledge of nonconforming perfor-
mance did not prevent or alter the accrual of income in Gillis.437
If the partnership knowingly failed to perform as promised, then 
how could the partnership have a fixed right to income from the 
deficient acts? Alternatively, if the partnership had a fixed right 
to income and the parties only needed to adjust the contract prices 
for the shipment of inferior cotton, then how could the partnership 
determine the amount of its income with reasonable accuracy 
without accounting for the buyer’s anticipated claims? A taxpayer 
should not knowingly fail to perform as promised and yet accrue 
income as if it had. 
 Perhaps the Gillis court never questioned income recogni-
tion because the partnership received all of the payments in full 
and reported them as income even though they were not properly 
earned.438 Elsewhere in its opinion, the court recited the mantra 
that taxpayers must recognize income upon receipt.439 The Ser-
vice likewise points to receipt as an event that fixes a taxpayer’s 
right to income.440 However, receipt seems ill suited to require 
income recognition attributable to a full performance where the 
taxpayer has knowingly failed to perform.441 In particular, any 
437 See id. at 508–10.  
438 See Gillis, 402 F.2d at 508.
439 Id. at 506. 
440 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
441 One might question whether the partnership had to report the amounts 
received as income under the claim of right doctrine. That doctrine requires a 
taxpayer to report income received under a claim of right and without re-
striction on its use or disposition even though the taxpayer might face a con-
tingent repayment obligation. See N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 
424 (1932). However, the doctrine does not apply to receipts that a taxpayer 
has an acknowledged, unconditional obligation to repay. See Ahadpour v. 
Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1210, 1214 (1999) (refusing to apply the claim of 
right doctrine where the taxpayer had “an existing and fixed obligation ... to 
repay the deposits” under a contract for the sale of property). Because the 
Gillis court found that the partnership knew of its unconditional liability for 
the buyer’s claims when it shipped the inferior cotton, the claim of right doc-
trine seems inapplicable to the claim amounts. Compare Gillis, 402 F.2d at 
508 (finding that the partnership had a fixed liability to the buyer because 
the partnership knew its obligations under the contract and knew it shipped 
nonconforming cotton), with Ahadpour, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1214 (refusing to 
apply the claim of right doctrine when a taxpayer knew it had an future obli-
gation to repay received deposits). 
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inference that the partnership had a fixed right to the entire 
contract price promised for full performance—under the formu-
laic due-paid-or-earned approach to the all events test—does not 
accord with the court’s finding that the partnership contempo-
raneously knew of its unconditional obligation to repay part of 
those amounts due to its failure to perform.442
 In this situation, the satisfaction of an implied condition 
of acceptance would establish a sound basis for concluding that 
the partnership had a fixed right to receive the contract prices.443
As discussed above, an acceptance of tendered goods commits a 
purchaser to pay the agreed upon purchase price regardless of 
whether the goods conform to their promised specifications.444
Accordingly, once the buyer explicitly or implicitly accepted the 
inferior cotton, the partnership secured a fixed right to the con-
tract prices despite its knowledge of its nonconforming ship-
ments.445 The partnership could later account for any of the buyer’s 
claims, whether fixed or contingent at shipment, as adjustments 
to the amount recognized as a result of the buyer’s acceptance.446
 The other notable feature of Gillis was the influence that 
industry norms for handling nonconforming performance had on 
the court’s application of the all events test.447 The court justifi-
ably took into account how private regulation, through interna-
tional arbitration, operates in the cotton industry.448 In addition 
to relying on arbitration for general disputes, trade associations 
in the industry have created a separate tribunal that makes 
binding determinations about whether delivered cotton meets the 
specifications in a contract.449 The tribunal provides a neutral 
basis for grading cotton, which is otherwise subjectively graded 
442 See Rev. Rul. 74-607, 1974-2 C.B. 149, 149–50 (requiring inclusion when 
performance fixes the right to receive income, unless payment is made or be-
comes due earlier). 
443 See supra text accompanying notes 361–65. 
444 Id.
445 See id. 
446 See Gillis, 402 F.2d at 508. 
447 See id. at 508, 510.
448 See id. at 509 (aspects of arbitration in international cotton industry); 
Recent Case, supra note 422, at 1454 (stating that the Gillis approach does 
not force a party to choose between arbitration and litigation and therefore 
does not penalize a party for utilizing arbitration). 
449 See Cotton Industry, supra note 157, at 1727. 
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by contracting parties and which is susceptible to damage (i.e., 
the cotton changes) after shipment and before delivery.450 The 
tribunal provides such an efficient mechanism for dealing with 
routine questions about whether a delivery conforms to specifi-
cations that its use has become a normal business practice that 
does not damage trading relationships,451 which presumably led 
the Gillis court to describe it as less adversative than traditional 
litigation.452 The Gillis court accordingly found that the routine 
mechanism for implementing and the mutual expectation of hav-
ing the market price paid for a delivery of inferior cotton fixed the 
partnership’s liability for the claims at shipment without treat-
ing the liability as contingent on receiving a final adjustment 
through the arbitration proceedings.453
 The routine use of nonjudicial mechanisms, including ar-
bitration, to address nonconforming performance is not unique 
to the cotton industry.454 Through self-regulation, contracting 
parties often seek to encourage conforming performances and 
address nonconforming aspects without relying on courts, without 
terminating agreements, and without imposing financial penal-
ties.455 These parties not only anticipate nonconforming perfor-
mance but they develop mechanisms to address it.456 Gillis pointed 
to aspects of finality in the cotton industry’s arbitration procedures, 
450 See id. at 1773–74. 
451 See id. at 1774 (“In general, transactors do not view asking for quality 
arbitration as damaging to their commercial relationship as long as it is not 
done too often.”). 
452 Where parties cannot tell whether an instance of nonconforming per-
formance or a claim of nonconformity results from unintentional causes or 
opportunistic motives, the tribunal prevents a breakdown of trade by provid-
ing a neutral determination of quality along with a nonpunitive adjustment 
to the appropriate market price. See id. at 1773–74. Without such measures, 
an instance of nonconforming performance or a claim of nonconformity, which 
would arise in an environment where the risk of inadvertent breach is high, 
would likely result in a termination of their relationship. See id. at 1775–77 
(“[C]ooperation is more likely to be maintained if transactors do not respond 
to every bad outcome by inflicting a punishment.”). 
453 See Gillis v. United States, 402 F.2d 501, 509–10 (5th Cir. 1968). 
454 See Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 23, at 991–92 (analyzing twelve dif-
ferent businesses that rely more on trade-norms and informal processes to resolve 
dispute than litigation); Lin, supra note 20, at 714 (stating that international 
companies increasingly favor arbitration as a tool to resolve disputes). 
455 See Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 23, at 991–92. 
456 See Gillis, 402 F.2d at 508. 
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which provided no judicial recourse, to “justify a tax treatment 
different from more porous and less final procedures of determining 
liability.”457 Other industries and taxpayers employ comparable 
self-contained mechanisms for addressing nonconforming perfor-
mances, and these mechanisms deserve similar considerations in 
applying the all events tests.458 Gillis appropriately emphasizes 
the need to take private regulation into account in determining 
fixed rights and liabilities; however, thoughtful consideration of 
applicable self-regulation efforts threatens to impose an admin-
istratively burdensome inquiry into the norms and practices of 
each industry or taxpayer as well as its mechanisms for resolv-
ing disputes.459
 The recognition of implied acceptance requirements under 
the all events tests provides an opportunity to avoid the admin-
istrative burden of assessing the impact on rights and liabilities 
of industry- —and taxpayer- — specific mechanisms for address-
ing nonconforming performance.460 Insofar as those mechanisms 
contemplate that parties will make price adjustments, follow correc-
tive steps, or take other actions without rejecting nonconforming 
performance, the mechanisms exhibit tolerances—whether by 
industry custom or mutual agreement—for certain deviations 
from required performances.461 The mechanisms effectively provide 
the means for dealing with nonconforming aspects of otherwise 
accepted performances.462 Although unraveling self-regulating 
mechanisms to determine their potential effect on rights and 
liabilities presents a burdensome task, the all events tests could 
alternatively simply acknowledge that these mechanisms apply 
to accepted performance and that the acceptance of conforming 
or nonconforming performance establishes an unconditional ob-
ligation to pay the contract price. The use of arbitration, as in 
Gillis, or other mechanisms to address possible nonconforming 
aspects of performance would not make the obligation to pay the 
457 Id. at 509. 
458 See Enforceable Arbitration of Commercial Disputes in the Textile In-
dustries, 61 YALE L.J. 686, 687 (1952) (presenting information on rayon, silk, 
and wool industries and their reliance on arbitration over litigation). 
459 Recent Case, supra note 422, at 1454.  
460 See id. (expressing potential for high administrative burden under Gillis
rule). 
461 See Gillis, 402 F.2d at 508. 
462 Id.
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contract price contingent.463 Instead, the mechanism might lead 
to an adjustment to the amount accrued for a right or liability 
otherwise fixed by acceptance.464 In short, self-regulating mech-
anisms do not have to complicate applications of the all events 
tests because the mechanisms apply to accepted performance, 
and acceptance provides a rational basis for identifying fixed 
rights and liabilities for purposes of the all events tests. 
CONCLUSION
 The increasing use of self-regulation by buyers and sellers 
presents a challenge for the all events tests.465 Self-regulation of 
process-related aspects of operations can enhance performance 
obligations, introduce credence qualities, and alter business rela-
tionships in ways that make the application of the all events tests 
uncertain.466 The potential for conforming and nonconforming per-
formance under a regulatory provision in a contract, for example, 
complicates efforts to identify a condition on payment obliga-
tions, the satisfaction of performance obligations, the certainty of 
rights and liabilities, and the knowable information about rele-
vant events.467 However, if the all events tests were to recognize 
an implied acceptance requirement as a condition on rights and 
liabilities for a sale of goods or services, then much of the uncer-
tainty in self-regulated relationships and other situations would 
disappear.468 This approach would acknowledge that a buyer’s ac-
ceptance, rather than the seller’s performance, establishes payment 
obligations. Therefore, acceptance could act as an identifiable 
event that fixes rights and liabilities for both conforming and 
nonconforming performances under the all events tests. 
463 See supra notes 361–65 and accompanying text. 
464 See Gillis, 402 F.2d at 508.
465 See supra text accompanying notes 1–4. 
466 See supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text. 
467 See supra Part I. 
468 See supra Part II. 
